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THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE AFRICAN UNION:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS
NSONGURUA J. UDOMBANAt
Just because we cannot see clearly the end of the road, ... that is no rea-
son for not setting out on the essential journey. On the contrary, great
change dominates the world, and unless we move with change we will be-
come its victims.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Society is not static but dynamic as well as organic. It is made up of
both structure and system. The structure determines the parts that are con-
tained in it. The system determines how those parts interact with each other.
Law is social purpose actualizing itself. Law participates in society's self-
forming and in human self-socializing by retaining past acts of social willing
with a view to their actualizing into future social willing. It organizes the
hold of the social past on the social future by organizing the hold of the so-
cial future on the social past. The human situation is not a condition but a
conjuncture. Hence, the future is determined by the flowing conjuncture of
society that is the ever-changing result of an infinite number of actualities
emerging from an infinite number of possibilities. As Philip Allot puts it,
t Senior Lecturer, Department of Jurisprudence and International Law, University of
Lagos, Nigeria; former visiting Research Fellow, The Danish Institute for Human Rights, Co-
penhagen, Denmark; LL.M., LL.B. (Lagos); udombana@hotmail.com. The author, who is a
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Journal of Public Law, American University International Law Review, Indiana International
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1. Arthur J. Olsen, Kennedy Exhorts the Poles to Further U.S.-Soviet Friendship, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 2, 1964, at C6 (quoting Robert F. Kennedy, Farewell Statement at Warsaw, Po-
land (July 1, 1964)).
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"[t]he present that was the future in society's past becomes.., the past of
society's next future."2
This brief abstract on the sociology of law is needed to indicate, for ex-
ample, how requirements of national life have compelled municipal legal
systems to recognize unincorporated associations as legal persons3 and how
international law is also being influenced by requirements of changing inter-
national life. One example of the latter is the increasing growth of interna-
tional institutions or organizations over the last six or so decades, mostly po-
litical bodies, "charged with political tasks of an important character, and
covering a wide field."4 These institutions have become "active performers
upon the world stage" 5 and have grown rapidly in recent years due, essen-
tially, to the increasing need for cooperation among nation-states based on
international norms. They provide a web of relationships that shape and
channel social interactions, taking over many functions that, previously,
were monopolistically regulated by States-such as control over currency,
passports and borders.6
Norms are, of course, a part of international institutions, establishing
ground rules and roles and meanings to constitute, constrain, shape and en-
able States and non-state actors.7 Indeed, the modern international system is
not "anarchic," if that term is used in the Hobbesian sense to connote the ab-
sence of an actor with legitimate authority to tell States what to do. States no
longer carry out mutual intercourse in a chaotic manner, without any regard
for common rules. Thus, while international institutions or organizations af-
ford the necessary opportunity for mutual intercourse, they also provide
means for international "governance"--defined as the ability to set priorities
and use power to realize them.8 Although governance among sovereign and
equal States has been regarded as "governance without government," 9 the
conduct of States in modern society is determined by certain principles and
procedures.
2. Philip Allott, Reconstructing Humanity-New International Law, 3 E.I.I.L. 219, 224
(1992). See generally PHILIP ALLOT, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD (1990).
3. See, e.g., Knight and Searle v. Dove, 2 Q.B. 631 (1964). In the absence of a constitu-
tional system, the primary test for recognizing such associations is that of functionality. See
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 678 (6th ed. 1998).
4. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 1.C.J. 174,
179 (Apr. 11).
5. MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 890 (1997) (discussing the approaches to in-
ternational institutions).
6. JACK DONNELLY, REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 131 & 141 (2000).
7. See id. at 131. See generally C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS (1996); H.G. SCHERMERS & N.M. BLOKKER,
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW (1995).
8. See Elisabeth Zoller, Institutional Aspects of International Governance, 3 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 121, 122 (1995).
9. See generally GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD
POLITICS (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
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International institutions also enable States to know what to expect from
each other. This allows them to routinely foresee and predict each other's re-
sponses and to adjust their conduct to the behavior of their counterparts.
"This pattern of mutual expectations and reciprocal behavior represents the
very fabric of the international order."" ° It may be predicted that as long as
the nation-state remains the community in which most men and women en-
vision fulfillment of their social needs, nation-states will continue to find
ways to carry on their day-to-day intercourse in an orderly and predictable
fashion. This is the role for which States have chosen to use international
law as the fundamental institution of international society. It is also for this
purpose that international law can be regarded as a serviceable instrument."l
The above assertions hold true for the defunct Organization of African
Unity (OAU), which was established via a Charter (OAU Charter) t" by the
independent African States to promote inter-African cooperation in the fields
of economics, culture, science and technology.' 3 However, on July 11, 2000,
the OAU adopted the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU Act)'4 to
replace the OAU Charter.'" The AU Act, which established the African Un-
ion (AU), was ratified with asthmatic breathlessness and entered into force
on May 26, 2001,16 less than one year after its adoption. As of September 26,
2002, all former Member States of the OAU have ratified the AU Act, with
the exception of Guinea-Bissau and Madagascar, though these two countries
signed the Act on July 12, 2000.17 It may be predicted that these countries
will ratify the Act in the coming months, not years.
The OAU was formally dissolved 8 on July 9, 2002, during the last
(38th) ordinary session of the OAU Assembly in Durban, South Africa.' 9
10. See Zoller, supra note 8, at 122.
11. See JAMES BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 78 (1949) (6th ed. 1963).
12. The Charter of the OAU was adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on May 25, 1963.
See Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39, 2 I.L.M.
766 (entered into force Sept. 13, 1963) [hereinafter OAU Charter].
13. See id. art. 11(2).
14. See Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, CAB/LEG/23.15 (entered
into force Sept. 13, 1963) [hereinafter AU Act], available at http://www.au2002.gov.
za/docs/key-oau/au-act.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2002).
15. Id. art. 33(1).
16. The AU Act was adopted on May 26, 2001. See id. art. 28 (providing that the Act
shall "enter into force thirty (30) days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by
two-thirds of the Member States of the OAU").
17. See African Union, List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceeded to the
Constitutive Act of the African Union (as at Sept. 26, 2002), CAB/LEG/23.15, available at
http://www.africa-union.org/enldocs/CONSTITUTIVE%20ACT.pdf (last visited Jan. 4,
2003).
18. There is an implied power, in the absence of any express contrary provision in the
constituent instrument, in the members of an international institution to dissolve it. The deci-
sion to dissolve an international institution need not be unanimous; rather, it is sufficient that
a substantial majority supports the decision. See l.A. SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW 565 (1994).
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The AU was formally launched during the same period, holding its first ses-
sion between July 9 and July 10, 2002, also in Durban, South Africa. With
the launching of the AU, the OAU ceased to be an umbrella international or-
ganization for collective Africa. However, during the rites of passage, the
AU Assembly sang nunc dimittis20 for the OAU, praising it "as a pioneer, a
liberator, a unifier, an organizer, and the soul of [the African] continent."-
2 1
The Assembly also praised the founding leaders of the OAU for "their tenac-
ity, resilience and commitment to African Unity" and for standing "firm in
the face of the decisive manipulations of the detractors of Africa and [fight-
ing] for the integrity of Africa and the human dignity of all the peoples of the
continent. 22
The AU Assembly, however, acknowledged that there are still promises
to keep and miles to go in actualizing true political and economical emanci-
pation of the continent. Consequently, the present leaders rededicated them-
selves "more resolutely" to the principles and objectives of the OAU "and to
the ideals of freedom, unity and development which the founding leaders
sought to achieve in establishing the Organization., 23 The only obstacle is
that transition from the OAU to the AU may not necessarily mean a transi-
tion of current leaders, many of whom ran the OAU as a mutual admiration
club. These dictators, despite the eulogy, brought their respective countries
to their knees due to bad governance, mismanagement and corruption.
This article undertakes a legal analysis of the institutional structure of
the AU. It will compare these institutions with their equivalents in other sub-
regional and supra-regional institutions, notably the institutions of the Euro-
pean Union (EU), to identify areas of strength and weakness. In Part II, the
article will adopt a bird's eye-view of the AU Act, rather than a close-up or
nuance picture. It will also briefly deal with the question of legal status of
the new body. Part III examines the Organs of the Union and proposes ways
of strengthening these Organs. In other words, suggestions are embedded in
the analysis. Part IV looks at the relationship between the AU, Member
States and their institutions, before concluding in Part V.
19. See UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Address at the 38th Assembly of Heads of
State and Government of the OAU (July 8, 2002), at www.au2002.gov.za/docs/speeches/
anna087a.htm.
20. See Luke 2:29-2:35 (KJV) (a farewell song of Simeon during the rite of purification
of Jesus).
21. Durban Declaration in Tribute to the Organization of African Unity and the Launch-
ing of the African Union, Assembly of the AU, 1st Ord. Sess., 14, A.U. Doc. ASS/AU/Decl.
2(I), Durban, South Africa (2002), available at http://www.africa-union.org/en/news.
asp?newsid=175 (last visited Nov. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Durban Decl.].
22. Id. 13. The Assembly also paid tribute "to all the Secretaries General and all the
men and women who served the OAU with dedication and commitment." Id.
23. Id. [14.
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II. THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE AU ACT AND THE QUESTION OF
LEGAL PERSONALITY
A. A Brief Overview of the A U Act
The AU Act establishes the AU as a political, economic and social or-
ganization and provides the basis of its operation.24 The AU replaced the
OAU,25 meaning that, as successor,26 it takes over the rights, powers and ob-
ligations of the OAU.2 7 The provisions of the AU Act, however, are not very
clear, especially regarding the nature of the Union. The AU Act provides
only a skeletal framework, leaving behind many issues that must be fleshed
out. Also, the AU is modeled almost entirely on the EU, which grew out of
its unique historical and political epoch.28 It is, in this respect, the work of
craftsmen, not artists-craftsmen copy; artists create. The provisions of the
AU Act also mirror those of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic
Community (AEC Treaty) 29 -ratified by all but seven African countries (ex-
cluding Morrocco) 3°-which also reflects the European model; there is, in-
24. See SHABTAj ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES, 1945-1986, at 181
(1989) (describing whether the constitutive instrument of an international organization is a
treaty or a constitution); see also TETSUO SATO, EVOLVING CONSTITUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS 163 (1996).
25. See AU Act, supra note 14, art. 33(1).
26. Note that succession between international organizations may occur in a number of
different forms. It may be by replacement, as the replacement of the League of Nations by the
United Nations or, as in this case, the replacement of the OAU by the AU; by absorption, like
the absorption of the International Bureau of Education by UNESCO; by merger; by effective
secession of part of an organization; or by a simple transfer of functions from one organiza-
tion to another. See SHAW, supra note 5, at 390. Succession may also be express or implied.
For the doctrine of implied succession, see International Status of South-West Africa, 1950
I.C.J. 128 (July 11) (holding, inter alia, that where an international organ, which is discharg-
ing certain functions in the international sphere, is dissolved, and the continued execution of
those functions has not been provided for by treaty or otherwise, then those functions may
automatically devolve on an international organ).
27. Note that succession of an institution to powers of another that has ceased to function
involves different considerations from that of a reconstituted organization. For further discus-
sion on succession, see generally P.R. MYERS, SUCCESSION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS (1993); H. Chiu, Succession in International Organisations, 14 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 83 (1965).
28. Formerly known as the European Economic Community, the EU was formed to en-
sure stability, following two world wars, and to counterbalance the strength of Germany and
defend Western Europe against the political threat from the east. See VISIONS OF EUROPEAN
UNITY 184-85 (Philomena Murray & Paul Rich eds., 1996) (discussing ideas of European
unity, from the inter-war period to the present).
29. Organization of African Unity Member States: Treaty Establishing the African Eco-
nomic Community, adopted June 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1241 (entered into force May 11, 1994)
[hereinafter AEC Treaty].
30. Forty-six African countries have ratified the AEC Treaty. See African Union, List of
Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Treaty Establishing the African Eco-
nomic Community (as at Sept. 26, 2002), CAB/LEG/28.1, available at http://www.africa-
union.org/en/docs/AFRICAN%20ECONOMIC%20COMMUNITY.pdf (last visited Jan. 4,
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deed, overlapping of elements. The AU Act, however, differs from the OAU
Charter in important respects. For example, whereas anti-colonialism and se-
curing national sovereignty were the ideological background and battle-
ground of the OAU,31 the AU is heading toward a transnational organization
that includes political, social and economic integration. The list of objectives
and principles in the AU Act is also more comprehensive than its equivalent
provisions in the OAU Charter. 32 For example, whereas the OAU Charter
contains seven principles, the AU Act contains sixteen.
33
The AU Act has thirty-three articles, besides its Preamble, which,
though not part of its substantive provisions, can be taken into consideration
when interpreting the Act.34 Although Article 2 establishes the Union, 35 in
accordance with relevant provisions of the Act, the articles relevant to its ex-
istence are Articles 27 and 28, providing for signature, ratification and ac-
cession as well as entry into force. The AU Act contains two major seg-
ments: the normative (which also includes some miscellaneous provisions as
well) and the institutional. The first segment is briefly highlighted in this
portion of the article. The second is the subject matter of the article and will
be taken up in detail later.
36
Articles 3 and 4, containing objectives and principles, form the norma-
tive portion of the Act and introduce areas of cooperation among Member
States. The Act, indeed, has many aims, but its general intent is to transform
"the existing institutional framework [of the OAU and AEC] into a qualita-
tively higher form of integration and cooperation that would better meet the
aspirations of the peoples of Africa for greater unity and solidarity in line
with the vision of the Founding Fathers."3 7 The Act, for example, eulogizes
2003). Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Madagascar, Somalia and Swaziland have signed
but have not yet ratified the AEC Treaty. Id. Eritrea is the only country that has neither signed
nor acceded to the Treaty. Id.
31. Cf Durban Decl., supra note 21, 2 (intending that "[t]he main objectives for estab-
lishing the organisation were, inter alia, to rid the continent of the remaining vestiges of colo-
nisation and apartheid; to promote unity and solidarity among African States; coordinate and
intensify cooperation for development; for the defence of sovereignty, territorial integrity and
consolidation of the independence of African States, as well as promoting interntional coop-
eration within the framework of the United Nations").
32. Compare AU Act, supra note 14, arts. 2-4 and OAU Charter, supra note 12, arts. I &
II.
33. Compare AU Act, supra note 14, art. 4 and OAU Charter, supra note 12, art. III.
34. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 22, 1969, art. 31,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980), reprinted in 63 AM. J.
INT'L L. 875 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (providing that the context for the pur-
pose of the interpretation of a treaty shall be, inter alia, its preamble). Consideration of the
preamble is normally necessary in cases of doubt.
35. See AU Act, supra note 14, art. 2 (providing that "[t]he African Union is hereby es-
tablished in accordance with the provisions of this Act").
36. See infra Parts II & III.
37. OAU, Report of the Second Meeting of Legal Experts and Parliamentarians on the
Establishment of the African Union and the Pan-African Parliament, SIRTE/Exp/Rpt (II)
[hereinafter Rep. of Legal Experts], para. 18.
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Member States' determination "to take all necessary measures to strengthen
our common institutions and provide them with the necessary powers to en-
able them to discharge their respective mandates effectively. 3 8
Article 3 spells out the purposes of the Union, including achievement of
"greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples
of Africa; '39 defense of "sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence
of its Member States; '40 and acceleration of "the political and socio-
economic integration of the continent.' '41 Other objectives include: promo-
tion and defense of "African common positions on issues of interest to the
continent and its peoples; 42 promotion of "peace, security, and stability on
the continent; 43 promotion of "democratic principles and institutions, popu-
lar participation and good governance;" 4 and establishment of "the neces-
sary conditions which will enable the continent to play its rightful role in the
global economy and in international negotiations.' ' These, indeed, are im-
portant objectives so long as they are not ends in themselves, but means to
an end-providing direction for the gradual realization of the objectives con-
tained in the AU Act.
Article 4 contains the principles upon which the Union will function,
such as "sovereign equality and interdependence among Member States of
the Union;,,46 "peaceful resolution of conflicts;- 47 "non-interference by any
Member State in the internal affairs of another;" 48 and "respect for democ-
38. AU Act, supra note 14, pmbl.
39. Id. art. 3(a).
40. Id. art. 3(b).
41. Id. art. 3(c); cf. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, art. 2 (en-
tered into force Nov. 1, 1993), reprinted in EUROPEAN UNION LAW: DOCUMENTS 1 (Frank
Emmert ed., 1999) [hereinafter EU Treaty] (providing that the objectives of the Union shall
be, inter alia, "to promote economic and social progress and a high level of employment and
to achieve balanced and sustainable development, in particular through the creation of an area
without internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and monetary union, ulti-
mately including a single currency in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty").
42. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 3(d).
43. Id. art. 3(f).
44. Id. art. 3(g).
45. Id. art. 3(i).
46. Id. art. 4(a).
47. Id. art. 4(e). See generally Tunde Adeniran, Pacific Settlement Among African States:
The Role of the Organization of African Unity, 2(2) CONFLICT Q. 12, 14 (1981).
48. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 4(g); cf. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, June 26,
1945, art. 2, paras. 4 & 7, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945), amended
by G.A. Res. 1991 (XVIII) of Dec. 17, 1963, 557 U.N.T.S. 143 (entered into force Aug. 31,
1965), and G.A. Res. 2101 of Dec. 20, 1965, 638 U.N.T.S. 308 (entered into force June 12,
1968), and G.A. Res. 2847 (XXXVI) of Dec. 20, 1971, 892 U.N.T.S. 119 (entered into force
Sept. 24, 1973) [hereinafter UN CHARTER]; Advisory Opinion No. 4, Nationality Decrees Is-
sued in Tunis and Morocco, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24-25; Interpretation of Peace
Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 1950 I.C.J. 65, 70-71 (Mar. 30); Case of the
S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 18-20 (Sept. 7); Asylum Case (Co-
lom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 274-75 (Nov. 20); Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (Fr. v. U.K.),
1953 I.C.J. 47, 52 (Nov. 17). The literature on the subject is legion. But see EDWIN
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ratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance. '49 The
non-interference principle has always been the bedrock of the continental
organization and was held by Member States as sacrosanct. This rendered
the OAU irrelevant to the needs of Africans, as the body became aloof to the
brutal and repressive regimes of many Member States; the OAU looked "the
other way" while its members were literally roasting and putting heavy
yokes on their citizens.5" Happily, the international community no longer
holds the principle as sacrosanct.51
The AU Act also enshrines the sanctity of colonial boundaries 52-uti
possidetius juris.3 It has been argued that uti possidetis was intended to
serve both an external and internal purpose; "externally, it would seek to
prevent irredentist tendencies by neighbors from turning into territorial
claims and the possible use of force. Internally, it would give clear notice to
ethnic minorities that secession or adjustment of borders was not an op-
tion."'54 The truth, however, is that it is presently difficult to reconcile uti
possidetis with a project whose ultimate purpose is to move the continent
towards a more integrated entity.
This portion of the article will not discuss the provisions of the AU Act
on the Organs because this will be the focus of the next section. There are,
however, other important provisions, such as those relating to sanctions on
any Member State that defaults in the payment of its contributions to the
budget of the Union-which has been the bane of the OAU-or fails to
comply with decisions and policies of the Union. The sanctions dictated by
the AU Act are similar to those of a typical social club, providing that:
DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES 260-64 (1972); INGRID DELUPIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE (1974); Declaration on Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc.
A/8082 (1970).
49. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 4(m). See generally JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P.
OLSEN, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE (1995) (describing an agenda of how individuals and so-
cieties can achieve institutions that make politics civil and capable).
50. See generally A. Bolaji Akinyemi, The Organization of African Unity and the Con-
cept of Non-Interference in Internal Affairs of Member-States, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 393
(1972-73) (discussing how the effectiveness of the OAU could be improved if the OAU stops
hiding behind the non-interference clause of Article 111(2)); Obi Okongwu, The OAU Charter
and the Principles of Domestic Jurisdiction in Intra-African Affairs, 13 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 589
(1973).
51. See, e.g., Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 31 I.L.M. 953, para. 17
(1992) (arguing that "the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty" has passed).
52. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 4(b).
53. See Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 566-67 (emphasizing that
uti possidetis constituted a general principle, whose purpose was to prevent the independence
and stability of new States from being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the
challenging of frontiers).
54. Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New
States, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 595 (1996). Cf. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 133 (asserting that
"pre-independence boundaries of former administrative divisions, all subject to the same sov-
ereign remain in being, is in accordance with good policy").
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The Assembly shall determine the appropriate sanctions to be imposed on
any Member State that defaults in the payment of its contributions to the
budget of the Union in the following manner: denial of the right to speak
at meetings, to vote, to present candidates for any position or post within
the Union or to benefit from any activity or commitments, therefrom.55
The Assembly may also deny a defaulting Member State transport and
communications links with other Member States, and may also impose other
measures of a political and economic nature as it deems fit. 56 Comparatively,
under Article 97 of the Financial Rules and Regulations of the OAU, default-
ing Member States can be deprived of their right to participate or to vote on
OAU decisions, but the Resolution on Arrears of Contribution further de-
prives such members of the right to speak at OAU meetings and their right to
present candidates for OAU posts or bodies.5 7 Recruitment of staff to the
Organs of the body from defaulting member countries is also prohibited, in-
cluding "temporary staff such as the freelance technical staff."58
Another provision relates to the headquarters of the Union, which will
remain in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,59 where the OAU has been conducting its
business for many years. This, however, is without prejudice to establish-
ment of other offices of the Union as the Assembly may determine.6 ° This
makes economic, even if not political,6 sense, because a change of head-
quarters will involve the huge expense of building another Secretariat and its
usual accompaniments. The porous financial position of the continental Or-
ganization should forbid it from embarking on any white elephant project, at
least for now.
There are already many incomplete projects that the AU must complete,
like the headquarters of the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
55. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 23(1).
56. Id. art. 23(2).
57. Resolution on Arrears of Contributions, Council of Ministers, 52d Ord. Sess., 91 2(d),
O.A.U. Doc. CM/Res. 1279 (LII), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (1990), reprinted in Letter Dated 15
August 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Niger to the United Nations Addressed to
the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Annex I, Prov. Agenda Item 30, U.N. Doc.
A/45/482 (1990); Resolution on Arrears of Contributions, Council of Ministers, 53rd Ord.
Sess., O.A.U. Doc. CM/Res. 1311 (LIII), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (1991).
58. See Decision on the Report of the Fifteenth Session of the Committee on Contribu-
tions (CM/2189 (LXXIII)), Council of Ministers, 73rd Ord. Sess., 6(c), O.A.U. Doc.
CM/Dec. 550 (LXXIII), Tripoli, Libya (2001), reprinted in Letter Dated 10 April 2001 from
the Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the United Nations Addressed to the Secre-
tary-General, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Annex II, Agenda Item 27, U.N. Doc. A/55/951
(2001).
59. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 24.
60. Id.
61. Until recently, Ethiopia, where the Headquarters of the OAU is situated, has been
embroiled in intractable interstate conflict with its neighboring Eritrea; a conflict that under-
mines the authority of the OAU itself. See, e.g., Divided by War, but Africa's Big Men Put on
a Show of Unity; African Summit Democrats and Despots Meet in Bid to End Bloodshed and
Poverty and Forge a Future for their Continent Modelled on Europe, INDEPENDENT (London),
July 10, 2001, at 3.
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Rights in Banjul, The Gambia, presently under construction.62 Even the pre-
sent Secretariat of the OAU/AU is a former prison that Emperor Haile Selas-
sie of Ethiopia donated to the body at its founding in 1963. Thirty-nine to
forty years later, an organization set up to liberate the continent and its
peoples from the bitter herbs of colonialism is still operating from a former
prison! A permanent headquarters has been under construction for years and
was not completed before the eclipse of the OAU. That task now falls on the
AU. This is another reason why a relocation of headquarters should not be
within the contemplation of the AU at this moment.
Other provisions of the AU Act address the working languages of the
AU and its institutions, which "shall be, if possible," African languages,
Arabic, English, French and Portuguese, 63 vestiges of colonialism. It is not
clear, however, what the criteria for selecting the "African languages" will
be. Previous attempts to adopt Swahili 6" as a common African language was
not met with general agreement. The new, improved AU might want to re-
consider it.
There are also provisions on admission to membership, which is re-
stricted to "African States."65 Admission will be decided by a simple major-
ity of Member States. 66 The Act does not, however, define a "State" for the
purposes of admission, which means that the relevant Organ of the AU, in
this case the Assembly, will decide if an entity seeking admission is a
"State."6 In the case Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in
the United Nations, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that condi-
tions for admission are subject to the judgment of the Organization, meaning
that the conditions for membership are subject to the judgment of the Or-
ganization's members. " It is not clear, however, whether an admission to
62. The foundation stone for the permanent headquarters was laid on October 24, 2001,
during the Commission's 30th session. See Foundation Stone Laid for ACHPR's Permanent
Building, 1(6) AFR. COMMISSION FOR HUM. & PEOPLES' RTS. BULL., July - Dec. 2001, at 7,
available at http://www.achpr.org/html/newsletter.htm (last visited Jan 4, 2003).
63. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 25.
64. "Swahili" means "the coast" and is, basically, of Bantu (African) origin. It, however,
has borrowed words from other languages, such as Arabic-probably due to the fact that the
Swahili people, being predominantly Muslims, used the Quran for spiritual guidance-and
some words from the Portuguese who controlled the Swahili coastal towns. Regarding the
formation of the Swahili culture and language, some scholars attribute these phenomena to the
intercourse of African and Asiatic people on the coast of East Africa. Early Arab visitors to
the coast used the word "Swahili," which later came to be applied to the people and the lan-
guage. See Hassan 0. Ali, A Brief History of the Swahili Language, at
http://www.glcom.com/hassaniswahili-history.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2002).
65. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 29(1).
66. Id. art. 29(2); cf OAU Charter, supra note 12, art. XXIV(I) ("This Charter shall be
open for signature to all independent sovereign African states and shall be ratified by the sig-
natory States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.").
67. See Ebere Osieke, Admission to Membership in International Organizations: The
Case of Namibia, 51 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 189, 220 (1986).
68. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, 1948 I.C.J.
57, 62 (May 28).
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membership by a simple majority will translate into collective recognition of
statehood. Brownlie is of the opinion that "[a]dmission to membership is
prima facie evidence of statehood, and non-recognizing members are at risk
if they ignore the basic rights of existence of another State the object of their
non-recognition."69
Unlike the OAU Charter, which had no express provision for suspension
or expulsion of erring members, the AU Act provides that "[g]overnments
which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be al-
lowed to participate in the activities of the Union."7 This provision reflects
the wave of democratization that is engulfing the continent. It restates, in a
capsule form, the Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to
Unconstitutional Changes of Government in 2000."' This Declaration pro-
claims a continent-wide commitment to democracy and attempts to give sub-
stance to that commitment by setting out "common values and principles for
democratic governance" in African countries.72 It unanimously rejects any
unconstitutional change in government as an anachronism and a contradic-
tion to Africa's commitment "to promote democratic principles and condi-
tions. 73
69. See BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 95.
70. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 30.
71. Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of
Government, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 36th Ord. Sess., O.A.U. Doc.
AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI), Lome, Togo (2000), available at http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/
unity/pdfs/oau/hog/10HoGAssembly2000.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Dec. on
Unconstitutional Changes of Gov't.]; cf see OA U/AU Declaration on the Principles Govern-
ing Democratic Elections in Africa, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 38th Ord.
Sess., O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Decl. I (XXXVIII), Durban, South Africa (2002), available at
http://www.africa-union.org/en/ commpub.asp?ID=106 (last visited Aug. 10, 2002) (reaffirm-
ing the principles of democratic governance in earlier instruments and asserting, inter alia,
that "[d]emocratic elections are the basis of the authority of any representative government,"
id. 11(1); and "[d]emocratic elections should be conducted: (a) freely and fairly; (b) under
democratic constitutions and in compliance with supportive legal instruments; (c) under a sys-
tem of separation of powers that ensures in particular, the independence of the judiciary; (d) at
regular intervals, as provided for in National Constitutions; [and] (e) by impartial, all-
inclusive competent accountable electoral institutions staffed by well-trained personnel and
equipped with adequate logistics," id. 11(4)).
72. Decl. on Unconstitutional Changes of Gov't, supra note 71, para. 8.
73. Id. para. 4. The Declaration sets out four scenarios that would constitute such an un-
constitutional change: "military coup d'itat against a democratically elected Government;
intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected Government; replacement of
democratically elected Governments by armed dissident groups and rebel movements; [and]
the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after free,
fair and regular elections." Id. para. 11. If any of these should occur, then a number of actions
are triggered. First, the Secretary-General "should immediately and publicly condemn such a
change and urge the speedy return to constitutional order." Id. para. 12. Second, he "should
also convey a clear and unequivocal warning to the perpetrators of the unconstitutional
change that, under no circumstances, will their illegal action be tolerated or recognized by the
OAU." Id. This appears to be commitment not to seat a delegation sent to the Organization by
the usurping regime. And, in fact, this is the next step. At the request of the Chairman, the
Secretary General or any Member State, the OAU Central Organ may be convened to con-
11
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The AU Act provides for cessation of membership, which is a
contradiction of the purposes of an international organization.74 Such
cessation, however, must be by notice and takes effect "[a]t the end of one
year from the date of such notification, if not withdrawn." 5 So far, only
Morocco has availed itself of this provision, under the OAU Charter. 6 It
withdrew from the OAU in 1984, in protest of the formal recognition of the
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) by the OAU.77 There are also
detailed provisions on amendment and revision of the AU Act. Any Member
State may submit proposals for an amendment.78 Libya has already kick-
started the process for the amendment of the AU Act, just two years after its
adoption! 9 The Assembly, on advice of the Executive Council, will examine
such proposals within one year, and, if the proposal is adopted "by
consensus or, failing which, by a two-thirds majority and submitted for
ratification by all Member States ... shall enter in force." 80 It is arguable
that this provision, which relaxes normal procedures under the Vienna
Convention,8 1 will enable the AU to revise the Act more easily than through
the normal law-making procedures of the Organization.
There is, finally, a transitional arrangement allowing the OAU Charter
to remain operative for a period of one year for such further period as the
Assembly may determine. 82 In 2001, the OAU decided that the one-year
transition period should run from July 2001, "in view of the magnitude of
the tasks to be performed and bearing in mind the need for consultations
denm the change. Id. paras. 13-14. A six-month period follows, during which a restoration of
constitutional government will hopefully occur. Id. para. 14. The Declaration provides that
"during the six month period, the government concerned should be suspended from participat-
ing in the Policy Organs of the OAU." Id. Finally, if after six months constitutional order has
not been restored, "a range of limited and targeted sanctions against the regime that stub-
bornly refuses to restore constitutional order should be instituted." Id. para. 15. A Sanctions
Subcommittee of the General Organ will be established to monitor compliance with its deci-
sions. Id. para. 17. It should be noted that virtually all these steps appear to be mandatory (ac-
tions "should" be taken, as opposed to "may").
74. See Rudolf Bindschedler, International Organizations, General Aspects, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1289, 1291 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000).
75. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 31(1).
76. See OAU Charter, supra note 12, art. XXXI.
77. GINo J. NALDI, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS ROLE 36
(2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter NALDI, ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY].
78. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 32(1).
79. See Decision on the Proposed Amendments to Articles of the Constitutive Act of the
African Union, Assembly of the AU, 1st Ord. Sess., A.U. Doc. ASS/AU/Dec. 6(I), Durban,
South Africa (2002), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/ humanrts/africa/audecl-8.html (last
visited Nov. 4, 2002) (considering proposal by Libya on amendments to articles of the AU
Act and calling on the interim Chairperson of the Commission to "circulate the Libyan
amendments to all Member States," id. 1).
80. AU Act, supra note 14, arts. 32(3) & (4).
81. See Vienna Convention, supra note 34, art. 40 (providing for the rules governing the
amendment of treaties where there are no express provisions in the treaty itself).
82. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 33(1).
12
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with Member States."83 On July 9, 2002, the transition period was terminated
and an interim period inaugurated for a duration of one year.84 Thereafter the
AU Assembly shall, at its second ordinary session, appoint the Chairperson,
Deputy Chairperson and the Commissioners through the Executive Coun-
cil."85 Meanwhile, the Interim Commission has been authorized to continue
with the transfer of assets and liabilities of the OAU to the AU.86 Also, the
Secretariat will "continue to use the OAU Logo, Flag and Anthem until the
General Secretariat or the Commission initiates and finalizes the process of
their review for gradual adaptation or replacement through competi-
tions ... "87
B. The Legal Personality of the A U
The attribution of personality to international organizations has become
indispensable in modem international law. It is not certain if this recognition
is derivable from the sovereign "will" of Member States or from general in-
ternational law.88 What is certain is the "conceptual need to come to terms
with the existence of international organizations, in conjunction with the
normative position that such organizations are generally a good thing."89 It is
a self-evident inference that without such recognition, these organizations
83. Decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Implementation
of the Sirte Summit Decision on the African Union, Assembly of Heads of State and Govern-
ment, 37th Ord. Sess., 15, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Dec. 160 (XXXVII), Lusaka, Zambia (2001)
[hereinafter Decision on Implementation], reprinted in Letter Dated 9 October 2001 from the
Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-
General, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 21(j), U.N. Doc. A/56/457 (2001).
The transitional period will enable the OAU and AEC, inter alia, to undertake the necessary
measures regarding devolution of assets and liabilities to the AU. It will also, plausibly, allow
for the selection of AU symbols-Logo, Flag, Anthem, etc.-formation of executive commit-
tee, and the creation of decision-making process for executive committee.
84. Decision on the Interim Period, Assembly of the AU, 1st Ord. Sess. I 2(iii), A.U.
Doc. ASS/AU/Dec. 1(I), Durban, South Africa (2002) [hereinafter Decision on Interim Pe-
riod].
85. Id.
86. Id. 2(ix); cf Decision on Implementation, supra note 83, T 12 (mandating the
Secretary General to "undertake the necessary measures for the devolution of assets and
liabilities of the OAU to the African Union" and to "review and, where appropriate, seek the
amendment of OAU agreements with other parties, including the Headquarters and Host
Agreements").
87. Decision on Implementation, supra note 83, 13.
88. See, for the debate, Finn Seyersted, Objective International Personality of Intergov-
ernmental Organizations: Do their Capacities Really Depend Upon Their Constitutions?, 34
NORDISK TiDssKRIFr FOR INTERNATIONAL RET OG Jus GENTIUM 1 (1964) (on file with the
California Western International Law Journal) (establishing "whether the capacity of an inter-
governmental organization really (i.e. in practice) depends upon the convention establishing
it").
89. Jan Klabbers, The Changing Image of International Organisations, in THE
LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 221, 227 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heis-
kanen eds., 2001).
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cannot carry out their tasks, because legal competences are necessary
corollaries of duties and responsibilities.
The question of legal personality of an international organization must
be decided by positive law and, in particular, the constituent treaty of such
an organization." Brownlie lists certain criteria of legal personality, each of
which relates to "delicate issues of law and fact."'" These are, "a permanent
association of states, with lawful objects, equipped with organs; a distinc-
tion, in terms of legal powers and purposes, between the organization and its
member States; [and] the existence of legal powers exercisable on the inter-
national plane and not solely within the national systems of one or more
states. '92 It is necessary to highlight features of the AU, as gauged from its
"Constitutive Act," in order to determine its personality. To start with, the
AU was created to take up the multifaceted challenges confronting the Afri-
can continent and peoples "in the light of the social, economic and political
changes taking place in the world."93 Though brought into being by the
Member States, it has a separate existence from them. It is endless in size
and eternal in time, allowing for the admission of other members "at any
time after the entry into force" of the Act.94
The objectives of the Act have already been highlighted. It remains to
add that Member States, signatories to the Act, subscribed to these objec-
tives. The Act opens with "We, Heads of State and Government of the
Member States of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) ... have agreed
as follows." 95 Furthermore, the objectives and principles in the Act are inde-
pendent of those of its Member States, though not diametrically opposed.
One of such principles is the "peaceful co-existence of Member States and
their right to live in peace and security."96 Another is the "peaceful resolu-
tion of conflicts among Member States of the Union through such appropri-
ate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly." 97
However, being an artificial entity, the AU does not have hands, legs,
eyes, a brain and such other organs that are the natural attributes of a person.
It can function only through various organs vested with special tasks and
manned by natural persons. The AU Act, consequently, establishes various
organs with defined functions. These organs, which will be discussed
shortly, are of the Organization, not of the Member States, though composed
essentially of the latter. Their powers extend to matters expressly mentioned
in the Act as well as those necessarily implied for effective performance of
90. See Bindschedler, supra note 74, at 1299.
91. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 680.
92. Id. at 679-80.
93. AU Act, supra note 14, pmbl. para. 5.
94. Id. art. 29(1).
95. Id. pmbl.
96. Id. art. 4(i).
97. Id. art. 4(e).
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their duties,98 such as the ability to confer diplomatic protection to its ser-
vants in the performance of their duties and to espouse their claims at the in-
ternational level. Rules concerning organization and procedure of the organs
will also be implied. If the end is intended, so also must be the means to at-
tain it. To use the language of the ICJ, "[t]he Organization must be deemed
to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter
[Act], are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the
performance of its duties."99 The Court of Justice of the EU has also adopted
the theory of implied powers, 10 but it should be borne in mind that "only
those powers... which least affect the freedom of member States and which
are shown to be necessary in order to fill genuine technical gaps in the
treaty" should be implied.10'
For these and for several other reasons, it is submitted that the AU, un-
doubtedly, is an international legal person, at least in relation to the Member
States. It also has an international legal responsibility-extending beyond,
but alongside, the Member States."0 2 It is, again to borrow the words of the
ICJ:
intended to exercise and enjoy ... functions and rights which can only be
explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of international
personality and the capacity to operate upon an international plane....
That is not the same thing as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is
not, or that its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those
of a State .... It does not even imply that all its rights and duties must be
upon the international plane, any more than all the rights and duties of a
State must be upon that plane. What it does mean is that it is a subject of
international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties,
and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international
claims. 1
0 3
98. There are certain debates on the powers of international organizations, including the
attribution theory and implied powers theory. See generally HENRY SCHERMERS & NILES
BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 206-236 (1995).
99. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J.
174, 182 (Apr. 11); see also International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 136-
38 (July 11); Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning
the Territory of South-West Africa, 1955 I.C.J. 67 (June 7); Admissibility of Hearings of Peti-
tioners by the Committee on South West Africa, 1956 I.C.J. 23 (June 1); South West Africa
(Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 319, 328-29 and 331 (Dec. 21).
100. See, e.g., Case 8/55, Federation Charbonniere de Belgique v. High Authority of the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 1954-1956 E.C.R. 292 (1956); Case 25/59,
Netherlands Government v. ECSC, E.C.R. 355 (1960); European Transport Agreement, Case
22/70, E.C.R. 263 (1971); Germany et al. v. Commission, Case 281/85, E.C.R. 3203 (1987).
101. See Bindschedler, supra note 74, at 1294.
102. See MosHE HIRSCH, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
TOWARD THIRD PARTIES: SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES 147-48 (1995) (on the responsibility of
Member States for acts attributable to international organizations).
103. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J.
174, 179 (Apr. 11).
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III. THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE AU
The character of an international organization depends on the nature of
its organs. For the AU, nine organs are provided for, each with a different
composition, power, sphere of operation, origin and voting procedure. The
organs expressly named in the Act are the Assembly of the Union, the Ex-
ecutive Council, the Pan-African Parliament, the Court of Justice, the Com-
mission, the Permanent Representatives Council, the Specialized Technical
Committees, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, and the Financial
Institutions." 4 The Assembly is, however, given power to establish any other
organ of the Union." 5 This will be crucial in the future due to the fact that
one of the major weaknesses of the Act is the absence of political mecha-
nisms to implement the Act and support its ambitious objectives.
It may also be assumed that those Organs of the AEC that are not incon-
sistent with the provisions of the AU Act will become AU Organs. 106 Fur-
thermore, the OAU Council of Ministers, which met in Lusaka between July
5 and July 8, 2001, called for incorporation of "organs, institutions/bodies
which have not been specifically mentioned in the Constitutive Act." Spe-
cifically and significantly, the AU Assembly has, at its first ordinary session,
decided that, "the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and
the African Committee of Experts on Rights and Welfare of the Child shall
henceforth operate within the framework of the African Union."'0 7 At the
end of the day, the list of AU Organs will cover anything that can be put in
the same catalog without being in the same category. What is clear is that the
list of Organs in the AU Act is longer than its equivalent provision in the
OAU Charter, but closely similar to the organs provided for in the EU'0 8 and
the AEC Treaty. 9 The OAU Charter provided for four principal institu-
104. See AU Act, supra note 14, art. 5.
105. Id. art. 5(2).
106. See id. art. 33(2) (providing that the "Act shall take precedence over and supersede
any inconsistent or contrary provisions of the [AEC Treaty]").
107. Decision on Interim Period, supra note 84, 2(xi).
108. The EU has five institutions: 1) the European Parliament (elected by the peoples of
the Member States); 2) the Council (representing the governments of the Member States); 3)
the Commission (the executive and the body having the right to initiate legislation); 4) the
Court of Justice (ensuring compliance with the law); and 5) the Court of Auditors (responsible
for auditing the accounts). Other bodies also support the five principal institutions. These are
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (advisory bodies
helping to ensure that the positions of the EU's various economic and social categories and
regions respectively are taken into account); the European Ombudsman (dealing with com-
plaints from citizens concerning maladministration at European level); the European Invest-
ment Bank (EU financial institution); and the European Central Bank (responsible for mone-
tary policy in the euro area). See generally P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUtoE TO EUROPEAN LAW
61-171 (7th ed. 1999).
109. AEC Treaty, supra note 29. The AEC Treaty provides for seven Organs including:
1) the Assembly of Heads of State and Government; 2) the Council of Ministers; 3) the Pan-
African Parliament; 4) the Economic and Social Commission; 5) the Court of Justice; 6) the
General Secretariat; and 7) the Specialized Technical Committees. Id. art. 7(1). The Special-
16
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tions: the Assembly of Heads of State and Government; the Council of Min-
isters; the General Secretariat; and the Commission of Mediation, Concilia-
tion and Arbitration. 110
It may be assumed that all the Organs in the AU Act, with, maybe, the
exception of the Assembly, are equal under the Act, although, in the real
world of politics, as in the animal world of George Orwell, some of these
Organs will be more equal than others. The OAU itself implies this when, in
mandating the Secretary General to undertake necessary consultations with
Member States with a view towards working out modalities and guidelines
for the launching of the Organs of the Union, he was asked to give priority to
the "key Organs"-the Assembly, the Executive Council, the Commission
and the Permanent Representatives.'1 1 What is striking, however, is that es-
tablishment of the Union, with full Parliament, Executive Council and Court
of Justice, is a novel phenomenon in collective Africa. A central government
that is bifurcated according to the political theory and legal doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers-legislature, executive and judiciary-is thus envi-
sioned. 2 This doctrine should, however, not be carried too far. As will be
shown shortly, certain vital matters, such as legislative powers, external en-
forcement and important acts of internal administration-like the budget-
are concentrated in the AU Assembly.
It has been suggested that more organs be added to the existing list, in
order to fully implement the objectives of the Union. There is, for example, a
febrile feminist advocacy for the creation of a Gender Commission, the role
of which will be to ensure that the AU's objective of promoting gender
equality" 3 is actually realized both in spirit and action. 14 One such advocate
believes that "a competent and committed person, preferably a woman who
should hold the rank of all other heads of the organs of the Union" should
head the Gender Commission. 1 5 Her responsibility will be to "monitor,
ized Technical Committee has seven components including: 1) the Committee on Rural
Economy and Agricultural Matters; 2) the Committee on Monetary and Financial Affairs; 3)
the Committee on Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters; 4) the Committee on Industry,
Science and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment; 5) the Committee on
Transport, Communications and Tourism; 6) the Committee on Health, Labour and Social
Affairs; and 7) the Committee on Education, Culture and Human Resources. See id. art. 25(1).
110. See OAU Charter, supra note 12, art. VII.
111. See Decision on Implementation, supra note 83, 4.
112. See African Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies, The New African
Union and the African Human Rights System, 11(2) AFR. HUM. RTS. NEWSLETTER, Apr.-June
2001, at 10) (on file with the California Western International Law Journal) (including ex-
tracts of Justice Kayode Eso's The Role of the African Human Rights System and Civil Society
in the African Union, a paper delivered at the NGO Forum organized by the African Center
for Democracy and Human Rights Studies, preparatory to the twenty-ninth Ordinary Session
of the African Commission).
113. See AU Act, supra note 14, art. 4(1).
114. See Maria Nzomo, The Architecture and Capacity of the African Union, Comments
at the AU/ADF III Symposium (Mar. 7, 2002), available at http://www.uneca.org/
ecaresources/Speeches/2002_speeches/030702prof maria.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2002).
115. Id.
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evaluate, review and recommend gender mainstreaming in all organs and ac-
tivities of the AU."' 16 She will also monitor application of the Act to ensure
gender equity in all governance and decision-making structures and proc-
esses. 
1 17
The gender concerns are certainly legitimate, but the African Union
should not go that far that fast. The poor financial state of the organization
cannot justify the creation of additional institutions at this time. It might
even make some sense to trim some of the unnecessary components of exist-
ing structures. Paradoxically, even the proposer of the Gender Commission
asserted that, "in building AU we should not just ask where resources are go-
ing to come from but also how we can cut down on costs. 118 The Union will
not cut cost by establishing other institutional structures that could actually
be accommodated elsewhere, but by "strengthening the still relevant existing
OAU institutions" and collaborating with the sub-regional institutions." 9
The OAU, to its credit, has over the years duly acknowledged the need
for the empowerment of women, as well as the needs of youth and children.
A Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women is already at an
advanced stage of elaboration before adoption by the AU. 2 ° This is expected
to fill in gaps that the African Charter created regarding rights of women.' 21
Although affirmative action is required to implement these norms, a special
Commission is not necessary at this time. There is nothing to show that the
existing structures, if properly funded and equipped, will not be able to
achieve such goals. Some Member States already have special ministries for
women's affairs, and the AU should encourage those States without such
ministries to create them. Implementation of these structures is needed more
at the grassroots, national level because that is where the majority of African





120. See Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6 (2000).
121. See The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981,
O.A.U. Doc. OAU/CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter Afri-
can Charter]. The Charter failed to sufficiently address the peculiar problems of women, such
as guaranteeing the right of consent to marriage and equality of spouses during and after mar-
riage. Furthermore, it did not explicitly address concerns that many customary practices, such
as female genital mutilation, are life threatening to women. See Chaloka Beyani, Toward a
More Effective Guarantee of Women's Rights in the African Human Rights System, in HUMAN
RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 288 (Rebecca Cook ed.,
1994) (noting that "[m]ale attitudes towards the treatment of women have dominated the con-
ception of human rights" and have failed to apply such rights to women in an equitable man-
ner, resulting in women concluding that abstract human rights ideals were never intended to
apply to women). See generally Claude E. Welch, Jr., Human Rights and African Women: A
Comparison of Protection under Two Major Treaties, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 549 (1993) (compar-
ing the African Charter to the Convention on the Elimination of All Form of Discrimination
Against Women).
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With these preliminary observations, this article now turns to an analy-
sis of the Organs of the AU.
A. The Assembly
The Assembly of the AU (AU Assembly or Assembly) is the political
organ of the Union, similar to the General Assembly of the United Nations
(UN) or the European Council of the EU. It is comprised of the Heads of
States and Government of member countries or their representatives. 122 It is
also "the supreme organ of the Union,"' 23 headed by a Chairman who shall
be "a Head of State or Government elected after consultations among the
Member States.' 124 It shall meet at least once a year in ordinary session and,
when approved by a two-thirds majority, in extraordinary session. 1 5
The AU Act, like its predecessor, the OAU Charter, is silent on the loca-
tion of the AU Assembly and of its meetings. The practice of the OAU As-
sembly was to meet in a different State capital each year. However, the
Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Union (Assembly Rules) 26 have
settled the problem, providing that the Assembly shall meet at the Headquar-
ters of the Union, "unless a Member State invites the Assembly to hold a
session in its country.' 27 Even where a Member State hosts the Assembly, 128
the meeting must always return to the Headquarters of the Union "at least
every other year.' ' 29
Usually, the host Head of State or Government becomes the Chairman
of the OAU until the subsequent summit. The AU Assembly has already
chosen to follow this practice, as demonstrated by the election of President
Thabo Mbeki of South Africa as the first Chairman of the AU. He was
elected during the inaugural summit of the AU Assembly hosted by South
Africa in Durban, in July 2002. This practice had its setbacks, leading to, for
example, the elections of acknowledged dictators and despots as heads of the
continental body, to the consternation of Africans and the international
community. Thus, despite opposition by some African countries-notably
122. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 6(1).
123. Id. art. 6(2); cf AEC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 8(1).
124. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 6(4).
125. Id. art. 6(3); cf OAU Charter, supra note 12, art. IX.
126. See Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Union, Assembly of the AU, 1st
Ord. Summit, A.U. Doc. ASS/AU/2(I)-a, Durban, South Africa, (2002), available at
http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/summit-counciI/assemrop.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2003)
[hereinafter AU Assembly Rules].
127. Id. Rule 5(1).
128. A Member State offering to host the Assembly will be responsible for the extra ex-
penses incurred by reason of holding the session outside the Headquarters of the AU. Id. Rule
5(2). Such State, which must not be under sanctions, shall additionally "meet pre-determined
criteria to be adopted by the Assembly, including adequate logistical facilities and a condu-
cive political atmosphere." Id. Rule 5(3).
129. Id. Rule 5(1).
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Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia-Idi Amin of Uganda was
elected as the Chairman of the Assembly when the country hosted the sum-
mit in 1975, notwithstanding his unenviable human rights records. In its pro-
test, the Government of Tanzania noted that, "Africa is in danger of becom-
ing unique in its refusal to protest crimes committed against Africans,
provided that such actions are done by African leaders and African govern-
ments." 130
The provision for a central location, namely the Headquarters of the Un-
ion, for the meeting of the Assembly is thus a welcome development. With
this new development, the Assembly will, hopefully, not have to "bend over
backwards" when appointing its Chairperson. The position, though merely
titular and ceremonial, elicits some aura and enjoys the respect of the inter-
national community when held by acknowledged statesmen. A Mandela
chairmanship, for purposes of illustration, makes a world of difference to a
Sani Abacha or, even, a Mugagbe chairmanship! A charismatic leadership is
urgently needed in Africa particularly, during these periods of economic and
political meltdown.
The AU Act vests the Assembly with crucial functions and wide au-
thorities, 3' largely similar to the functions of the European Council under
the EU.'32 The Assembly will determine the common policies of the Union
and monitor their implementation by the Member States.'33 It will also adopt
the budget of the Union; "receive, consider and take decisions on reports and
recommendations from the other organs of the Union; [and] consider re-
quests for Membership of the Union."' 34 The Assembly will appoint the
principal officers of the AU Organs-such as the judges of the Court of Jus-
tice, the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson of the Commission and other
Commissioners. 35 It will also determine their functions and terms of of-
fice.'36 Additionally, the Assembly may "give directives to the Executive
Council on the management of conflicts, war and other emergency situations
and the restoration of peace."' 37 The new Rules have extended the Assem-
bly's functions'38 to include electing the Chairperson of the Assembly and
other officers'3 9 and deciding upon the venue of its meetings. 4
°
130. Claude E. Welch, Jr., The OAU and Human Rights: Towards a New Definition, 19
J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 401, 405 (1981) (quoting statement issued on July 25, 1975 by the Tan-
zanian Ministry of Information and Broadcasting).
131. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 9.
132. See, e.g., EU Treaty, supra note 41, art. 4 (providing that the European Council
shall provide the political impetus for the EU, defining the general political guidelines of the
EU).
133. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 9(1)(a) & (e).
134. Id. art. 9(1)(b)-(c).
135. Id. art. 9(1)(h)-(i).
136. Id. art. 9(1)(g).
137. Id.
138. See generally AU Assembly Rules, supra note 126, Rule 4.
139. Id. Rule 4(1)(p).
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The Assembly will also, undoubtedly, assume other functions not enu-
merated in the AU Act or the Assembly Rules, such as the appointment of
members of the African Commission under the African Charter,'4 ' a function
formerly performed by the OAU Assembly. In the event of the death or res-
ignation of a member of the Commission, the Assembly will also have the
power to replace that member for the remainder of his term. 4 ' The Assem-
bly will also be responsible for the appointment of judges to the African
Human Rights Court pursuant to Protocol to the African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human
and Peoples' Rights 143 and, like the Commission, the Assembly can replace
any member of the Court in the event of any vacancy. I4"
Furthermore, the African Charter empowers the Assembly to delegate to
the African Commission tasks other than those enumerated in the Charter. 45
The Assembly receives the Annual Activity Report from the Commission
and exerts some political pressure on errant States by, inter alia, authorizing
publication of the reports, pursuant to the African Charter.146 When the
Court is established, the Assembly will also be involved in monitoring exe-
cution of its judgments through the Council of Ministers,'47 and receive an-
nual reports detailing the work of the Court.148 Such reports shall, inter alia,
specify "the cases in which a State has not complied with the Court's judg-
140. Id. Rule 4(1)(q).
141. Cf African Charter, supra note 121, art. 33 (providing that "[tihe members of the
Commission shall be elected by secret ballot by the Assembly of Heads of State and Govern-
ment, from a list of persons nominated by the States parties to the present Charter").
142. See id. art. 39(3).
143. See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Estab-
lishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 9, 1998, art. 14(1),
OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT (III), available at http://www.africa-union.org/en/docs/
protocol%20african%20court.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Prot. to African Char-
ter] (providing that "[t]he judges of the Court shall be elected by secret ballot by the Assem-
bly").
144. See id. art. 20(2) ("The Assembly shall replace the judge whose office became va-
cant unless the remaining period of the term is less than one hundred and eighty (180) days.").
145. See African Charter, supra note 121, art. 45(4). The Commission is the institutional
body charged with the implementation of the rights guaranteed in the African Charter. It was
given a sweeping but weak mandate "to promote human and peoples' rights and ensure their
protection in Africa." id. art. 30. The Commission, essentially, performs three primary func-
tions: to promote and protect human and peoples' rights and to interpret the provisions of the
African Charter. Id. art. 45. See generally Peter Amoah, The African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights: An Effective Weapon for Human Rights?, 4 REVUE AFRICAINE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL ET COMPARt [RADIC] 226, 237 (1992); RACHEL MURRAY, THE AFRICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS & INTERNATIONAL LAW 11-31 (2000); EVELYN
ANKUMAH, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS 27 (1996).
146. African Charter, supra note 121, art. 59 ("The report on the activities of the Com-
mission shall be published by its Chairman after it has been considered by the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government.").
147. See Prot. to African Charter, supra note 143, art. 29(2).
148. Id. art. 31.
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ment."' 49 Finally, but not exhaustively, the Assembly will likely take over
the dispute resolution function previously assigned to the Assembly of the
AEC, pursuant to the Protocol on the Relationship between the African Eco-
nomic Community and the Regional Economic Communities.' 50
As already demonstrated from the last submission of the Assembly in
Durban, South African, it is clear that immediate concerns of the Assembly
will include economic development and conflict resolution,'51 combating of
poverty and disease'52 and, with September 11, joining forces in the global
"war" against terrorism.'53
149. Id.
150. See Protocol on the Relationship between the African Economic Community and
the Regional Economic Communities, opened for signature Feb. 25, 1998, art. 30, reprinted
in 10 REVUE AFRICAINE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET COMPARI [RADIC] 157 [hereinafter
AEC Protocol on RECs].
151. See, e.g., Decision on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union, AU Assembly, 1st Ord. Sess., A.U. Doc. ASS/AU/Dec. 3 (1), Durban, South
Africa (2002) [hereinafter AU Assembly Dec. on Peace and Security Council], available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/audecl-8.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2002) (adopting the
Protocol on the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU and calling on "all
Member States to sign and ratify the Protocol so as to ensure its early entry into force"); see
also Decision on a Common African Defence and Security, AU Assembly, 1st Ord. Sess.,
A.U. Doc. ASS/AU/Dec. 8 (1), Durban, South Africa (2002), [hereinafter AU Assembly Dec.
on Common African Defence], available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/ africa/audecl-
8.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2002) ("stress[ing] the need for a common African defense and
security in the context of the [AU Act] [and] request[ing] the Chairman of the Assembly to
establish a group of experts to examine all aspects related to the establishment of a common
African defence and security and submit recommendations for the consideration of the next
session of the Assembly").
152. See, e.g., Decision on the Status Report on Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immu-
nization (GAVI), Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 38th Ord. Sess., 1 3-5,
O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Dec. 174 (XXXVIII), Durban, South Africa (2002), available at
http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/summitcouncil/oaudecl.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2002)
(acknowledging "that vaccines constitute one of the most effective means of improving health
and reducing the suffering and mortality occasioned by infectious diseases [and] urg[ing]
Member States to take all necessary measures to ensure that every child in Africa is fully im-
munized by widening, for all children, the range of basic vaccines (measles, poliomyelitis,
BCG and DTC) to include Hepatitis-B Vaccines." The Assembly further urged "Member
States to establish more effective linkages between immunization and health sector develop-
ment in general, and create technical partnerships between low and medium income countries
to promote experience and resource sharing so as to reduce the gap between children born in
different environments.").
153. See, e.g., Report on OAU Efforts to Prevent and Combat Terrorism, Central Organ
of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at Ministerial
Level, 5th Extra-Ord. Sess., Organ/MEC/MIN/2/Ex.ord (V), New York, USA (2001), avail-
able at http://www.africa-union.org/en/commpub.asp?id=137 (last visited Aug. 26, 2002).
This document reported, inter alia, on the Summit meeting of Heads of State and Government
that convened on Oct. 17, 2001, at the initiative of President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal. Id.
18. The summit brought together twenty-seven African countries in Dakar and was attended
by the OAU Secretary General. ld. It adopted the Dakar Declaration against Terrorism which,
inter alia, "expressed solidarity with the USA; strongly condemned any act of terrorism on
the African continent or in any other part of the world; called upon all the African countries to
ratify the OAU Convention [on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, AHG/Dec. 132
(XXXV)] as a matter of urgency and similar UN instruments and take the legal, diplomatic,
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The Assembly shall adopt its own Rules of Procedure,'54 which, as indi-
cated above, has already been done. The Assembly Rules provide further and
better particulars on the workings of the Assembly, giving flesh to the bare
bones of the AU Act on the many aspects of the Assembly. The new Assem-
bly Rules have similarities with the Rules of Procedure of the OAU Assem-
bly,155 though it takes a more nuance posture than its predecessor. The As-
sembly Rules have been drafted to describe, prescribe and empower. This is
important because clusters of rules that define relationships are of little use,
unless they also sufficiently empower the agencies that will apply them.
The Assembly Rules cover matters such as the composition of the As-
sembly,156 its power and functions, 57 place of meeting and the quorum, 158
ordinary and extraordinary sessions, 159 agenda of the meetings, 6 ° public and
private meetings of the Assembly,' working languages, 6 ' election and
functions of the Chairperson,163 and attendance and participation in the ses-
sions of the Assembly."6' Section III of the Assembly Rules addresses deci-
sion-making procedures including: majority rule,'65 decisions, 66 speaker
lists and use of the floor, 16 7 point of order,168 and closing and adjournment of
debate. 69 There are also rules on voting rights, which specify that each State
will receive one vote (provided such a State is not under sanctions) 70 and
financial and other measures to fight against terrorism at the national, sub-regional, regional
and international levels." Id.
154. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 8.
155. The Rules of Procedure of the OAU Assembly [hereinafter OAU Assembly Rules
of Proc.], reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY 25-31 (Gino J.
Naldi ed., 1992) [hereinafter NALDI, DOCUMENTS].
156. See AU Assembly Rules, supra note 126, Rule 3.
157. Id. Rule 4.
158. Id. Rules 5 & 6.
159. Id. Rules 7 & 11.
160. Id. Rules 8, 9 & 12 (regarding ordinary and extraordinary sessions, respectively).
161. Id. Rule 13.
162. Id. Rule 14. It is important to note that the Assembly Rules include Spanish as one
of the working languages of the Assembly, although the AU did not include it as one of the
official languages of the AU. Compare AU Act, supra note 14, art. 25 and AU Assembly
Rules, supra note 126, Rule 14. Although this may have been included to accommodate the
interests of some Member countries, this will need to be reflected in any subsequent amend-
ment to the AU Act because the AU Act, being a superior instrument, prevails in the event of
conflict with the Assembly Rules.
163. AU Assembly Rules, supra note 126, Rules 15 & 16.
164. Id. Rule 17.
165. Id. Rule 18.
166. Id. Rule 19.
167. Id. Rule 20.
168. Id. Rule 21.
169. Id. Rules 22 & 23.
170. Id. Rule 26. If a State is subject to sanctions, that State will not have the right to
vote. Id.
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method of voting (secret ballot).17 1 Some provisions of the Assembly Rules
require extended comments.
The rules governing the members of the Commission are laid out in
Rules 38 through 42. The duties of the Chairperson, for example, include:
convening sessions of the Assembly, opening and closing the sessions, sub-
mitting the records of the sessions for approval by the Assembly, directing
debates, granting use of the floor, submitting matters under discussion to a
vote and announcing the results and ruling on points of order in accordance
with the AU Act and the Rules of the Assembly. 172 Because the Assembly's
meetings are not frequent, the Chairperson must, between sessions and con-
sultations with the Chairperson of the Commission, represent the AU in con-
formity with the fundamental objectives and principles of the AU Act." 3
Like the OAU Assembly, the AU Assembly "shall take its decisions by
consensus or, failing which, by a two-thirds majority of the Member States
of the Union,"' 7 4 although "procedural matters, including the question of
whether a matter is one of procedure or not, shall be decided by a simple ma-
jority.'"175 The requirement of unanimity in the decision-making process fol-
lows from the doctrine of the equality and sovereignty of States; in other
words, no State can be bound without its consent. 7 6 This principle, which is
frequently applied for political reasons-even in situations where a majority
voting would be adequate-undermined the effectiveness of the OAU. 177 On
the other hand, a qualified majority will facilitate the power of the AU to
make decisions and to act on them, particularly in crisis situations that might
require humanitarian intervention. Such situations frequently beckon in Af-
rica.
The Rules provide that the Assembly's decisions may take one of three
forms. Decisions may be in the form of regulations to all Member States to
"take all necessary measures to implement them.' 178 Decisions may also take
the forms of directives "addressed to any or all Member States, to undertak-
ings, or to individuals.' 79 Such directives "bind Member States to the objec-
tives to be achieved while leaving national authorities with power to deter-
mine the form and the means to be used for their implementation."'
8 °
Finally, decisions may be in the form of recommendations, declarations,
171. Id. Rule 30(1). The Assembly, however, may adopt other methods of voting on pro-
cedural matters. Id. Rule 30(2).
172. See id. Rule 16(1).
173. Id. Rule 16(3).
174. See AU Act, supra note 14, art. 7(1); cf AU Assembly Rules, supra note 126, Rule
6; UN CHARTER, supra note 48, art. XXV (empowers the Security Council to take binding
decisions on certain matters by a majority vote).
175. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 7(1).
176. See OAU Charter, supra note 12, art. X.
177. See NALDI, ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, supra note 77, at 19.
178. AU Assembly Rules, supra note 126, Rule 33(l)(a).
179. Id. Rule 33(1)(b).
180. Id.
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resolutions or opinions.' In general, resolutions or recommendations of in-
ternational organizations are not binding on Member States; rather they are
formal texts formulating the conclusions of debates and "are intended to
guide and harmonise the viewpoints of the Member States.' 82 They nor-
mally "request," "urge," "take note," or "agree to," thereby indicating their
limited competence. However, resolutions are very persuasive evidence of
international law. When resolutions are concerned with general norms of in-
ternational law, acceptance by a majority vote constitutes evidence of the
opinions of governments in the widest forum for the expression of such
opinions.'83 As Hans Kelsen puts it:
if the norm is adopted by a majority-vote decision of an organ, composed
of representatives of all parties to the treaty establishing the organ, and es-
pecially by the majority-vote decision of an organ composed only of rep-
resentatives of some of the parties to this treaty, the creation of the norm
assumes the character of legislation. 84
Some declarations or resolutions, or parts of them, may eventually be-
come binding under international law if their provisions are shown to have
become general practice by States. If they attain this status, they are said to
have become part of customary international law.' 85 In some cases, resolu-
tions may have direct legal effects, both as authoritative interpretations and
as applications of the principles of the treaty and the speedy consolidation of
customary rules.' 86
The AU Assembly may delegate any of its powers and functions to any
organ of the Union,'87 though it is the only body able to amend or revise the
AU Act by a consensus or two-third majority. 88 However, unlike the Euro-
pean Council, which must submit to the European Parliament, "a report after
181. Id. Rule 33(l)(c).
182. id.
183. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 98-104 and 107-08 (June 27).
184. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 507 (2d ed. 1966).
185. See South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.) 1966 I.C.J. 6, 292 (July 18)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka).
186. See BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 14. See generally JORGE CASTANEDA, LEGAL
EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS (1969).
187. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 9(2); cf AU Assembly Rules, supra note 126, Rule
4(2); AEC Treaty, supra note 29, arts. 8(2) & (3). Note that the AEC Prot. on RECs addition-
ally vests on the AEC Assembly a dispute resolution function. AEC Prot. on RECs, supra
note 150, art. 30.
188. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 32. Proposals for an amendment or revision of the treaty
may be submitted by any Member State to the Chairman of the Commission, "who shall
transmit same to Member States within thirty (30) days of receipt thereof. The Assembly,
upon the advice of the Executive Council, shall examine the proposal within a period of one
year" and, where an amendment is made effective, such amendment "shall enter into force
thirty (30) days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification with the Chairman of the
Commission by a two-thirds majority of the Member States." Id. arts. 32(2) - 32(4).
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each of its meetings and a yearly written report on the progress achieved by
the Union," '189 the AU Assembly has no such obligation under the AU Act. It
is, however, submitted that such a procedure will be necessary in order to al-
low for checks and balances within the system, which is a built-in principle
of the doctrine of separation of powers. African leaders need such checks,
because of the frequent "trends towards omnipotence."' 90
B. The Executive Council
The Executive Council of the AU (AU Council or Council) will func-
tion both as a political body and an economic body of the Union. It "shall be
composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or such other Ministers or Au-
thorities as are designated by the Governments of Member States."' 9' This is
analogous to the composition of the Council of Ministers of the OAU,' 92 as
well as the Council of the EU, where composition is geared to specific sub-
ject areas.' 93 The foreign minister or the minister responsible for the subject
matter in question, such as agriculture, education, finance, transport, etc.,
comprises the Council of the EU. This means that the Council's composition
varies according to the subject discussed.
The AU Council will obviously be a diplomatic Organ, like the AU As-
sembly. The members will inevitably be bound by the instructions of their
governments. Like the AU Assembly, the Council is not a permanent body;
but unlike the Assembly, which meets once a year, the Council will meet at
least twice a year.'94 When requested and approved by two-thirds of its
members, the AU Council may meet in a special or "extra-ordinary" ses-
sion.' 95 This follows the practice of the Council of Ministers of the OAU,
which met in February and August of each year.' 96 At the February meet-
ings, the Council usually considered and approved the program and budget
of the OAU for the subsequent fiscal year.' 97 Indeed, the Rules of the OAU
Council of Ministers provided that "[lt]he fiscal year of the Organization
189. EU Treaty, supra note 41, art. 4.
190. CHRISTOPHER G. WEERAMANTRY, JUSTICE WITHOUT FRONTIERS: FURTHERING
HUMAN RIGHTS 89 (1997).
191. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 10(1).
192. See OAU Charter, supra note 12, art. XII.
193. See European Community Treaty, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 203, 37 I.L.M. 56, reprinted
in EUROPEAN UNION LAW: DOCUMENTS (Frank Emmert ed. 1999) (providing that "[t]he
Council shall consist of representative of each Member State at ministerial level, authorised to
commit the government of that Member State"). For an informative and detailed account of
the work of the Council, both in its generic sense and sectorially, see MARTIN WESTLAKE, THE
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (1995).
194. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 10(2).
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Rules of Procedure of the Council of Ministers [hereinafter Rules of
Council of Ministers], Rule 6, reprinted in NALDI, DOCUMENTS, supra note 155, at 19.
197. Id.
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shall be from the first of June to the thirty-first of May." '98 However, during
the Durban meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers in July 2002-the last
of such meetings under the auspices of the OAU-the Council fixed the
financial year of the AU from January 1 through December 31.'9
The AU Act does not indicate the meeting place of the AU Council, but
it may be assumed that, like the Council of Misters of the OAU, the sessions
of the AU Council shall be held at the Organization's headquarters. 200 This
conclusion is further fortified by the fact that the Assembly has also chosen
the headquarters of the Union for its annual sessions, subject to the excep-
tions contained in its Rules.20" A quorum of not less than two-thirds of the
total membership of the Council will be necessary for meetings. 2 Like the
AU Assembly, the Council shall adopt its own Rules of Procedure; 203 it is
likely that the Rules of Procedure of the Council of Ministers of the OAU
will serve as a template. Basically, the Rules will cover issues concerning
the composition and functions of the Council; matters relating to meetings,
election and functions of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman; quorum and de-
bates, voting, resolutions; and amendments to the Rules.204
The Council "shall take its decisions by consensus or, failing which, by
a two-thirds majority of the Member States. 20 5 This contrasts with the
Council of Ministers of the OAU, where a simple majority adopted resolu-
tions," apparently because "Council resolutions are merely recommenda-
tions to the Assembly which is the organ competent to take final deci-
sions. ' For the AU Council, a simple majority vote is required only for
procedural matters, including the question of whether a matter is one of pro-
cedure or not.208 For its European counterpart, it is not so straightforward.
The general rule is that the Council acts by a majority of its members.20 9
However, in a great majority of the cases, the EU Treaty requires a qualified
198. Id.
199. Decision on the Financial Situation of the Organization as at 31 May 2002, Council
of Ministers, 76th Ord. Sess., T 4, O.A.U. Doc. CM/Dec. 651, Durban, South Africa (2002),
available at http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/summitcouncil/cmdecl.htm (last visited Sept.
11,2002).
200. Cf Rules of Council of Ministers, supra note 196, Rule 8.
201. AU Assembly Rules, supra note 126, Rule 5.
202. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 11(2); cf Rules of Council of Ministers, supra note 196,
Rule 18.
203. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 12.
204. See generally Rules of Council of Ministers, supra note 196.
205. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 11(1).
206. See OAU Charter, supra note 12, art. XIV(2); Rules of Council of Ministers, supra
note 196, Rule 29 ("All resolutions shall be determined by simple majority of the members of
the Council of Ministers.").
207. NALDI, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, supra note 77, at 21.
208. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 11(1).
209. See European Community Treaty, supra note 193, art. 205(1).
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majority and, in some cases, unanimity. For this purpose, votes of each
Member State are weighed21° to maintain a particular equilibrium.
Unlike the Council of Ministers of the OAU, it appears that decisions of
the AU Council will be binding in their entirety on those to whom they are
addressed; this will, presumably, include the Member State, a firm or an in-
dividual.
The AU Council is responsible for the functioning and development of
the AU and accountable to the AU. It considers issues that the Assembly re-
fers to it and monitors the implementation of policies the Assembly formu-
lates.21' Its activities, which are at the core of integration, amplify the man-
date of the Council of Ministers under the OAU Charter.212 Specifically, the
AU Council shall coordinate and take decisions on policies in areas of com-
mon interest to the Member States. Such areas include:
foreign trade; energy, industry and mineral resources; food, agricultural
and animal resources, livestock production and forestry; water resources
and irrigation; environmental protection, humanitarian action and disaster
response and relief; transport and communications; insurance; education,
culture, health and human resources development; science and technology;
nationality, residency and immigration matters; social security, including
the formulation of mother and child care policies, as well as policies relat-
ing to the disabled and the handicapped; [and] establishment of a system
of African awards, medals and prizes.2
13
The AU Council will also receive project proposals from the Special-
ized Technical Committees as well as reports and recommendations on im-
plementation of provisions of the Act.2" 4 It will also be involved in giving
directives on meetings of the Committees,21 5 as well as recommending any
future establishment of "other offices of the Union" to the Assembly.21 6 It
will advise the Assembly on any proposal for the amendment or revision of
the AU Act.217 It may also have the power to request advisory opinions from
the AU Court of Justice, pursuant to the AEC Treaty, 1 8 but subject to the
210. Id. art. 205(2). These are weighed as follows: Belgium (5); Denmark (3); Germany
(10); Greece (5); Spain (8); France (10); Ireland (3); Italy (10); Luxembourg (2); Netherlands
(5); Austria (4); Portugal (5); Finland (3); Sweden (4); and United Kingdom (10). Id.
211. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 13(2).
212. See, e.g., OAU Charter, supra note 12, art. XIII(2) (entrusting the Council of Minis-
ters with the function of coordinating inter-African cooperation, "in accordance with the in-
structions of the Assembly [and in] conformity with Article 11(2) of the present Charter"). Art.
11(2) included coordination and harmonization of "economic cooperation, including transport
and communications; educational and cultural cooperation; health, sanitation, and nutritional
cooperation; scientific and technical cooperation; and cooperation for defence and security."
Id. art. 11(2).
213. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 13(1).
214. Id. art. 15(a) & (d).
215. Id. art. 16.
216. Id. art. 24(2).
217. Id. art. 32(3).
218. See AEC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 11 (f).
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Protocol on the Court that is yet to be elaborated. Like the AU Assembly,
however, the Council will be actively involved in activities of both the Afri-
can Commission and the Court. It will, for example, monitor execution of
the Court's judgments on behalf of the Assembly.219
Comparatively, the European Community Treaty organizes activities of
its Council around three separate areas: the Union's Community activities;
the common foreign and security policy; and the cooperation in the field of
justice and home affairs.22 ' In Community activities, for example, the Coun-
cil ensures Member States' coordination of general economic policies and
their responsibilities in the fields of education, culture, health, European citi-
zenship and visa policy.
221
C. The Pan-African Parliament
Like the AU Assembly, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) is another
political organ of the AU. Its establishment, like its EU counterpart, is to
"ensure the full participation of African peoples in the development and eco-
nomic integration of the continent. "222 The AU Assembly reiterated this
rhetoric of popular participation, through the PAP, during its first ordinary
session in South Africa, in July 2002; thus, "[i]n order to ensure the in-
volvement of our peoples and their civil society organisations in the activi-
ties of the Union, we recommit ourselves to the early establishment of the
Pan African Parliament and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council
(ECOSOCC) as envisaged in the Constitutive Act of our Union." 223
The AU Act, however, did not define the composition, powers or func-
tions of the PAP. These were left for a later protocol.22 4 Happily, this is now
academic, as the Assembly of the OAU, at its 5h Extraordinary Summit in
Sirte on March 2, 2001 has adopted the Protocol to the AEC Treaty to estab-
2251hlish the Pan-African Parliament, pursuant to the recommendation of the
219. See Prot. to African Charter, supra note 143, art. 29(2).
220. The European Community Treaty confers on the Council the responsibility of en-
suring that the objectives set out in the treaty are attained. European Community Treaty, su-
pra note 193, art. 202. The Council also coordinates the general economic policies of the
Member States, with power to take decisions and "to confer on the Commission, in the acts
that the Council adopts, powers for the implementation of the rules that the Council lays
down." Id. In some cases, the Council may reserve the right to exercise its implementing
powers directly itself. Id.
221. See generally EUROPEAN UNION, INTERINSTITUTIONAL DIRECTORY (1995).
222. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 17(1); cf Roquette Freres v. Council, [1980] E.C.R.
3333 (1980), para. 33 (regarding, as a "fundamental democratic principle[,] that the peoples
should take part in the exercise of power through the.intermediary of a representative assem-
bly").
223. See Durban Decl., supra note 21, 17.
224. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 17(2); cf AEC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 14(2).
225. See Decision on the Draft Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic
Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament, Assembly of the Heads of State and
Government, 5th Extra-Ord. Sess., O.A.U. Doc. EAHG/Dec. 2 (V), Sirte, Great Jamahiriya
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7 3rd Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers.22 6 Although this falls
short of the 2000 deadline set by the OAU for the establishment of the Par-
liament,227 it is better late than never.
The PAP Protocol, signed by twenty-one Member States and ratified by
three countries,228 will enter into force after the deposit of the instruments of
ratification by a simple majority of the Member States. 229 It has twenty-five
articles and deals with the anatomy and physiognomy of the PAP. It estab-
lishes a PAP to "represent all the peoples of Africa" 230 with the ultimate aim
of evolving "into an institution with full legislative powers, whose members
are elected by universal adult suffrage."'231 The PAP, however, is vested only
with consultative and advisory functions,232 apparently because African
leaders do not want to subordinate the AU Assembly to any other political
organ in terms of policy formulation and creation of binding decisions.
The PAP shall be composed of five representatives from Member
States, one of whom must be a woman,233 thus striking a note of gender sen-
sitivity, even if it is a semi-tone and not nearly deep enough. If all fifty-three
of the erstwhile OAU Member States ratify the AU Act, then the total num-
ber of Parliamentarians will come to 265 or 270 whenever Morocco rejoins
the Organization.2 4 The European Parliament, 235 in contrast, allots specific
(2001) (adopting the Draft Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Com-
munity Relating to the Pan-African Parliament). Twenty-one Member States have signed the
Protocol so far and three countries have ratified it. See Transition from the OAU to the Afri-
can Union, available at http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/background/oau-to-au.htm (last vis-
ited Aug. 11, 2002). The Protocol will enter into force after the deposit of the instruments of
ratification by a simple majority of the Member States. Protocol to the Treaty establishing the
African Economic Community (AEC) Relating to the Pan-African Parliament, Mar. 2, 2001,
art. 22, available at http://www.au2002.gov.za/ docs/key-oau/papprot.htm (last visited Jan. 6,
2003) [hereinafter PAP Protocol].
226. See Decision on the Draft Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic
Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament (Doc. CM/2198 Annex 1), Council of
Ministers, 73rd Ord. Sess., O.A.U. Doc. CM/Dec. 566 (LXXIII), Tripoli, Libya (2001).
227. See Sirte Declaration, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 4th Extra-Ord.
Sess., 8(ii)(b), O.A.U. Doc. EAHG/Decl. (IV) Rev.1 ("We aim to establish that Parliament
by the year 2000, to provide a common platform for our peoples and their grass-root organiza-
tions to be more involved in discussions and decision-making on the problems and challenges
facing our continent.").
228. See Transition from the OAU to the African Union, supra note 225.
229. See PAP Protocol, supra note 225, art. 22.
230. Id. art. 2(2).
231. Id. art. 2(3).
232. Id.
233. Id. art. 4(2).
234. The OAU is currently making efforts to restore the broken relationship and bring
Morocco back to its fold. See, e.g., David Bamford, OAU Considers Morocco Readmission,
BBC NEWS, July 8, 2001 (stating that the OAU is currently making efforts to restore the bro-
ken relationship with Morocco) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/africal1428796.stm (last
visited July 25, 2002).
235. The European Parliament consists of representative of the peoples of the States
brought together in the Community. European Community Treaty, supra note 146, art. 189. It
exercises powers conferred upon it by the Treaty, including participation in legislative and
30
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 1 [2002], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol33/iss1/3
2002] THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE AFRICAN UNION 99
numbers of representatives for each Member Country,236 the total of which
must not exceed seven hundred. 237 The numbers are calculated on the basis
of population, but are weighed in favor of the small States in order to avoid
excessive concentration of voting in the hands of a few large States and to
ensure proper representation of various political opinions.238
Numerically then, the European Parliament is larger, in comparison, to
the PAP. However, it must be stressed that the EU has the financial muscle
to support such numbers, and this is made possible by the strong financial
commitment of Member States to the Union. A forest a thousand years old is
still collectively alive because some trees are dying and others are growing
up. This is not the case in Africa, where Member States do not always pay
their dues on time, if at all. Indeed, if the current paralytic financial state of
the continental body is anything to go by, then it is doubtful that the Organi-
zation will be able to support the PAP, because each of the Parliamentarians
"shall be paid an allowance to meet expenses in the discharge of their du-
ties.- 239 This will, presumably, include transportation to and from the seat of
Parliament, lodging, food, secretarial support, and a thousand-and-one other
miscellaneous or incidental expenses that usually accompany such picnics.
What is more, the devil is usually in the details of such expenses, as corrup-
tion has become a rooted reality, indeed, a lingua franca, in most African
countries. It is also the bane of the continent. Sad but true!
Each member of the PAP "shall be elected or designated by the respec-
tive National Parliaments or any other deliberative organs of the Members
States."2" Unlike the European Parliament, where members serve for a fixed
term of five years,241 the term of office of a member of the PAP "shall run
concurrently with his or her term in the National Parliament or other delib-
erative organ." '242 This means that a person will cease to be a member of the
PAP when, inter alia, he correspondingly ceases to be a member of, or is re-
called by, his National Parliament or other deliberative organ. 243 This
method of electing the Parliamentarians to the PAP has advantages and
budgetary processes of the institutions of the EU and in the EU's initiatives in areas of foreign
and security policies as well as cooperation in the field of justice. See generally THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Corbett Richard et al. eds., 1995)
236. See European Community Treaty, supra note 193, art. 190(2).
237. Id. art. 189(1).
238. The allotment are as follows: Belgium (25); Denmark (16); Germany (99); Greece
(25); Spain (64); France (87); Ireland (15); Italy (87); Luxembourg (6); Netherlands (31);
Austria (21); Portugal (25); Finland (16); Sweden (22); and United Kingdom (87). Id. art.
190(2).
239. PAP Protocol, supra note 225, art. 10.
240. Id. art. 5(1).
241. European Community Treaty, supra note 193, art. 190(3).
242. PAP Protocol, supra note 225, art. 5(3).
243. Id. art. 5(4). Additionally, the seat of a member will become vacant if he or she
dies; resigns in writing to the President; cannot perform his or her functions due to physical or
mental incapacity; is removed on the basis of misconduct; or if his or her State withdraws
from the Union. Id. arts. 5(4) & 19.
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drawbacks. On the bright side, it will reduce the huge cost and numerous lo-
gistical problems that a continent-wide electoral process would entail.2"' On
the dark side, it will allow some members to serve for longer periods than
others, depending on the constitutional arrangements in each Member State.
Africa is still infested will all kinds of governments-pseudo-democratic,
oligarchic, authoritarian, totalitarian, paternalistic, hierarchical and monar-
chical (basically, all forms of dictatorships). It is, thus, doubtful if the ar-
rangement under the PAP Protocol will bring harmony, in view of these dif-
ferent constitutional and non-constitutional structures.
Another shortcoming of the PAP Protocol is its failure to allot some
quota for non-governmental institutions in the PAP, with the result that the
PAP will be made up of only recycled and partisan politicians. The civil so-
ciety-defined as comprising those associational bodies between the person
and the State245-has effectively been left out; but it must resist such mar-
ginalization because the business of the continent is too serious to be left
solely in the hands of often selfish, corrupt and opportunistic politicians
alone. Everyone should be given a sense of ownership of the AU. The PAP
must be broadened from a government-led process to one that engages the
broadest spectrum of Africans, including citizens, their elected representa-
tives, civil society organizations, intellectuals and academics, the private
sector, and the Diaspora. The AU must work to restore the propulsion of all
communities.
The ultimate aim of the PAP, of course, will be "to evolve into an insti-
tution with full legislative powers whose members are elected by universal
adult suffrage." '246 This is the practice in Europe 247 and is an ideal situation
because it creates uniform standards. It will ensure that all eligible citizens of
Member States have the opportunity to aspire for membership of the PAP.
Floating of political parties at the continental level will also not be a bad idea
because they allow broad based, continent-wide participation. In addition,
uniformity of elections and suffrage will assure integration within the Union
and contribute to forming an African awareness and voice that expresses the
political will of the citizens of the Union.248 That way, there will be a recip-
rocal pleasure in governing and being governed.
Whichever method of election is employed, it is vitally important that
the process not only be fair, but it must also be perceived as fair. This will be
critical not only to the legitimacy of the process but also to the legitimacy of
244. Cf. Rep. of Legal Experts, supra note 37, para. 26.
245. See Paul Gifford, Book Review, 30 J. RELIGION IN AFR. 494, 495 (2000) (reviewing
CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (Nelson Kasfir ed.,
1998)).
246. See PAP Protocol, supra note 225, art. 2(3).
247. The European Parliament is allowed to draw up a procedure "for elections by direct
universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States or in accor-
dance with principles common to all Member States." See European Community Treaty, su-
pra note 193, art. 190(4).
248. Cf. id. art. 191.
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the AU itself. Common values embedded in African traditions, rule of law
and constitutionalism should form the foundation for an effective and de-
mocratic AU. Ownership by the African people, both men and women,
should form the linchpin of legitimacy.
The objectives of the PAP shall be to facilitate effective implementation
of the policies and objectives of the AEC and the AU; "facilitate cooperation
and development in Africa; promote the principles of human rights and de-
mocracy in Africa; [and] encourage good governance, transparency and ac-
countability in Member States. 249 Others are to:
familiarize the peoples of Africa with the objectives and policies aimed at
integrating the African Continent within the framework of the establish-
ment of the AU; promote peace, security and stability; contribute to a
prosperous future for the peoples of Africa by promoting collective self-
reliance and economic recovery; strengthen continental solidarity and
build a sense of common destiny among the peoples of Africa; and facili-
tate cooperation among [RECs] and their Parliamentary fora.
250
In pursuit of these objectives, the PAP, either on its own initiative or at
the request of the Assembly or other policy organs, can examine, discuss or
express an opinion on any matter and make such recommendations it may
deem fit.251 Such matters should relate to human rights, the consolidation of
democratic institutions, the promotion of good governance and the rule of
law.252 The PAP shall also discuss its budget and that of the AU and make
recommendations for the Assembly's approval and work towards
harmonization of the laws of Member States. The harmonization of laws will
be a particularly Herculean task-though a necessary one-in view of the
mosaic character of the laws of African countries, a colonial legal heritage.
The PAP will also make recommendations, possibly to the AU Assembly,
towards the attainment of the objectives of the AEC and draw the attention
of relevant bodies to the challenges facing the integration process in Africa
and proffer strategies for dealing with them.253 It shall promote programs and
objectives of the AEC in the constituencies of Member States.2 54
The Parliamentarians "shall vote in their personal and independent ca-
",255pacity, which means that they are not to be dictated to and should refuse
any dictation by their home governments. To ensure independence, the Pro-
tocol provides that PAP members shall not perform executive or judicial
functions in their countries that are incompatible with their functions as Par-
249. PAP Protocol, supra note 225, art. 3.
250. Id.
251. Id. art. 11(1).
252. Id.
253. Id. art. 11(4).
254. Id.
255. Id. art. 6.
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liamentarians.256 The Protocol, however, allows the PAP to work in close
cooperation with parliaments of the RECs, national parliaments or other de-
liberative organs of Member States. This will, subject to its Rules of Proce-
dure, include "conven[ing] annual consultative fora... to discuss matters of
common interests." 257 It is, however, not clear whether the PAP will have
supra-national prerogative over national parliaments. This question arose
during the second meeting of Legal Experts. It was suggested that, "if the
[Pan-African] Parliament were to be vested with supra-national powers, it
would be necessary to define the nature of the Executive Branch that would
enforce its legislative enactments. 258 Because this has not been done, it may
be assumed that the PAP will exercise no supra-national powers, though this
position might change in the near future.
While exercising their functions, the Parliamentarians shall enjoy in the
territory of each Member State immunities and privileges extended to repre-
sentatives of Member States under the General Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the OAU259 and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations,26" though the PAP has the power to waive such immunity.261
Privileges and immunities of international diplomats rest on several theories,
such as the representative theory (which emphasizes the diplomat's role as
an agent of a sovereign State, such as, in this case, the AU) and the func-
tional theory (which rests on practical necessity).262
Whatever the theory, it is important to stress that the provision of privi-
leges and immunities "is neither merely a housekeeping problem for those
organizations nor an insidious encroachment on the equal application of the
rule of law, but is rather an essential device for protecting these organiza-
tions from unilateral and sometimes irresponsible interference by individual
governments., 263 Furthermore, it may be assumed that immunities and privi-
256. Id. art. 7.
257. id. art. 18.
258. Rep. of Legal Experts, supra note 37, para. 28.
259. General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of Afri-
can Unity, Oct. 25, 1965, 1000 U.N.T.S. 393 [hereinafter OAU Privileges and Immunities
Cony.].
260. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, 55
AM. J. INT'L L. 1064 (entered into force Apr. 24, 1964) [hereinafter Vienna Relations
Convention]. "Parts of the Convention are based on existing practice and other parts
constitute a progressive development of the law." BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 349-50.
261. PAP Protocol supra note 225, art. 8; cf U.N. CHARTER, supra note 48, art. 105(2)
("Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization
shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent ex-
ercise of their functions in connexion with the Organization").
262. Cf Vienna Relations Convention, supra note 260, pmbl. (providing that "the pur-
pose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient
performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States"); see also Private
Servant of Diplomat Case, 71 I.L.R. 546 (Aus. Sup. Ct. 1971); Dorf Case 71 I.L.R. 552 (Nor.
Sup. Ct. 1973); BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 351.
263. Paul Szasz, International Organizations, Privileges and Immunities, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1325, 1326 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000).
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leges will cover PAP's support staff, whether their rank be high or low, their
assignments diplomatic, professional, technical, secretarial or merely man-
ual. Such extension, of course, might provide grounds for attack by Member
States because of practical problems relating to the massive increase in dip-
lomatic personnel.264
The ICJ stressed the importance of the principles embodied in the Vi-
enna Relations Convention in the Case Concerning United States Diplo-
matic and Consular Staff in Tehran.265 In this case, the Iranian Government
was held responsible for failing to prevent and, subsequently, approving the
actions of militants who invaded the United States Embassy in Tehran and
held diplomatic and consular personnel "hostage." The Court observed, "the
obligations of the Iranian Government here in question are not merely con-
tractual ... but also obligations under general international law." '266 This ob-
ligation is, however, without prejudice to rights of the host State to require
diplomats to leave its territory if they abuse their privileges.267
Similarly, subject to the right of waiver of immunity, Parliamentarians:
shall enjoy parliamentary immunity in each Member State. Accordingly, a
member of the Pan-African Parliament shall not be liable to civil or crimi-
nal proceedings, arrest, imprisonment or damages for what is said or done
by him or her within or outside the Pan-African Parliament in his or her
capacity as a member of Parliament in the discharge of his or her duties. 268
Article 12 of the PAP Protocol deals with the Rules of Procedure and
Organization of the PAP, providing for election of the President and four
Vice-Presidents, which must reflect the geographical milieu of the conti-
nent.269 The terms of office of the President and Vice-Presidents shall, like
other Parliamentarians, run concurrently with their terms at their national
parliaments. 270 These officers "shall be responsible for the management and
administration of the affairs and facilities of the Pan-African Parliament and
its organs. 271 This also, presumably, includes representing the Parliament in
its external relations with the other Organs of the AU, as well as other as-
pects of international relations. The President or, in his absence, the Vice-
Presidents, who are "ranked in accordance with the result of their votes and
264. Cf. Vienna Relations Convention, supra note 260, art. 11(1) (providing that the re-
ceiving State may require that the size of a mission be kept within limits considered by it to be
reasonable and normal).
265. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1979 I.C.J. 7,
18-19 (Order of Dec. 15); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 30, 30-43 (Judgment of May 24).
266. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. at 31, 33 & 41.
267. Szasz, supra note 263, at 1329.
268. PAP Protocol, supra note 225, art. 9(1).
269. Id. art. 12(2).
270. Id. art. 12(3).
271. Id. art. 12(5).
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subsequently by rotation, ' 272 will preside over all Parliamentary proceedings,
except those held in committee. 273 There are also provisions dealing with va-
cancy of the President or Vice-Presidents, method of their removal, filling of
such vacancies, quorum for meetings of the PAP-which shall be by a sim-
ple majority-voting rights, and committees. 74
277
Other provisions in the PAP Protocol deal with oath of office,27 ses-
sions, 2 76 budget,277 seat of the PAP-which is determined by the Assem-
bly278 -and the working languages, which shall be, "if possible, African lan-
guages, Arabic, English, French and Portuguese"-vestiges of
colonialism. 279 There are also provisions on withdrawal, 280 interpretation, 28'
signature and ratification,282 entry into force,283 accession,284 amendment or
revision, 28 5 as well as review of the Protocol-which shall be carried out af-
ter the first five years of its entry into force and subsequently every ten
years.2 86
In principle, the PAP is conceived as a legislative body capable of creat-
ing international law-like the EU. This is a great advance in the develop-
ment of the law of international institutions in Africa, unlike the OAU,
whose Charter contemplated and provided that the objectives of the OAU
would be carried out principally through harmonization of the general poli-
cies in various fields. With time, however, the OAU was able to create inter-
272. Id. art. 12(4).
273. Id. art. 12(7).
274. See id. arts. 12(8) - (14).
275. Id. art. 13 (providing that "[a]t its first sitting, after the election and before proceed-
ing with any other matter, the Pan-African Parliamentarians shall take an oath or make a sol-
emn declaration").
276. Id. art. 14 (providing details regarding who will preside over sessions, frequency of
sessions, Extraordinary sessions and that "the proceedings ... shall be open to the public").
277. Id. art. 15 (providing that the PAP's budget will be an "integral part" or the regular
budget of the OAU/AEC and the manner in which the budget will be drawn up).
278. ld. art. 16 (stating that the seat of the PAP will be determined by the Assembly, but
that the PAP can convene in any Member State's territory upon invitation).
279. Id. art. 17.
280. Id. art. 19 (providing that "[tlhe Pan-African Parliamentarians from a Member State
which withdraws from the Community shall automatically cease to be Pan-African
Parliamentarians").
281. Id. art. 20 (providing that "[t]he Court of Justice shall be seized with all matters of
interpretation emanating from [the PAP Protocol]").
282. Id. art. 21 (stating that the PAP Protocol will be signed and ratified by Member
States according to their Constitutional procedures and that the instruments of ratification will
be deposited with the Secretary General of the OAU).
283. Id. art. 22 (providing that the PAP Protocol will "enter into force thirty (30) days
after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by a simple majority of the Member
States").
284. Id. art. 23 (providing that any Member State can accede to the PAP Protocol after its
entry into force by notifying the Secretary General).
285. Id. art. 24 (stating that the PAP Protocol can be amended or revised by the decision
of a two-thirds majority of the Assembly).
286. Id. art. 25.
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national law "through the adoption of multilateral law-making treaties and
resolutions (or declarations), in addition to the longer established law-
creating process of custom-formation. "287 In carrying out its mandate, it will
be important for the PAP to constantly draw lessons from existing regional
parliamentary structures, both within and without Africa, such as the South
African Development Community (SADC) Parliamentary Forum, the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Parliament, the
European Parliament, the Latin American/Andean Parliament and the Asia-
Pacific Parliamentary Forum.
D. The Court of Justice
The Court of Justice (AU Court) is another Organ of the AU.288 It is the
judicial counterpart of the political organs (the Assembly and the Executive
Council) and the economic and social organs (the Executive Council and the
Economic, Social and Cultural Council) of the AU. Like the PAP, however,
"its statute, composition and functions shall be defined in a separate proto-
col, '289 though its judges shall be appointed and terminated by the Assem-
bly.2 11 It is crucial that the appointment of judges be carried out with great
circumspection. They should be appointed from the ranks of qualified law-
yers (those who hold the highest national judicial posts or are recognized ju-
risconsults) and whose independence is beyond question. Because Africa is a
continent where wisdom and virtue are not the only or most common quali-
fication for a place in the government, serious effort must be made to ensure
that the Court is not composed of agents and mouthpieces of Member States.
The judges must be completely independent of their governments, both in
theory and in practice.
Similarly, in drawing up the protocol and defining the composition and
functions of the Court, the independence of the Court must be fully guaran-
teed. It will also be important to bear in mind the different legal traditions in
Africa and, as is customary with the OAU organs, to reflect an equitable
geographical balance in the composition of the Court. It is equally important
that the PAP Protocol be gender sensitive. Happily, the AU Act has the
"promotion of gender equality" as one of its principles.29'
The AU Act, however, provides that "[t]he Court shall be seized with
matters of interpretation arising from the application or implementation of
287. See Tiyanjana Maluwa, International Law-Making in the Organisation of African
Unity: An Overview, 12 REVUE AFRICAINE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET COMPARt [RADIC]
201, 201-02 (2000).
288. See AU Act, supra note 14, art. 5(1)(d).
289. Id. art. 18.
290. Id. art. 9(h).
291. Id. art. 4(1).
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this Act. 29 2 It shall also interpret the PAP Protocol.29 3 This implies that
some of the organs of the AU, such as the AU Assembly or the AU Council,
will have the competence to seek an advisory opinion of the Court on inter-
pretation of the Act. Because interpretation of the constituent instrument of
an international organization is always a matter within the functions of that
organization, the organization is thus always entitled to request an advisory
opinion from the Court on the point. The advisory function of the Court will
assist the organs of the AU in the resolution of legal questions that affect
their work, providing them with a means of resolving legal questions on
which concrete aspects of their work depend. However, in the Legality of the
Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (request by the World
Health Organization (WHO)), 294 the ICJ held that an organization "is not
empowered to seek an opinion on the interpretation of its Constitution in re-
lation to matters outside the scope of its functions." '295 The Court held, in re-
lation to that case, that the WHO had no competence to address the question
of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons.
296
In general, the Court will have to strike a balance between a restrictive
interpretation, which seeks to protect the sovereignty of Member States, and
the principle of effet utile (effectiveness). A restrictive interpretation of a
treaty clause must not render ineffective the limitations and duties intended
by the parties and provided for by the treaty. 297 Thus, the rule of thumb
292. Id. art. 26; cf. European Community Treaty, supra note 193, art. 220 (describing the
duties of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)).
293. See PAP Protocol, supra note 225, art. 20.
294. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J.
66 (July 8).
295. Id. at 82; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 1.C.J.
226, 232-35 (July 8), 35 I.L.M. 809, 817.
296. Contra Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996
I.C. J. 66, 128-29 (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry) ("I find it difficult also to ac-
cept that an organ of the United Nations, empowered to seek an advisory opinion on a ques-
tion of law, has no competence to seek an interpretation of its own Constitution."); Dapo
Akande, The Competence of International Organizations and the Advisory Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, 9 E.J.I.L. 437 (1998). Akande argues, inter alia, that:
an organization always has some competence to deal with breaches of its constitu-
tion. This competence may be limited and the steps the organization may take in
the event of such breaches may have limited practical effect, but one can say that
the breach of an organization's constitution is always a matter within the scope of
concern of that organization and always a matter on which the organization can
take some action (whatever that action may be). The Court seems to have ignored
this possibility. By so doing, the Court's opinion may well have limited the pros-
pect of international organizations obtaining assistance from the Court on a matter
(the breach of their constitution) they are entitled to discuss.
Id. at 454.
297. The Vienna Convention furnishes the guidelines for the process of trying to estab-
lish from the text of a treaty the intention of the parties, so as to determine the proper applica-
tion of the treaty in specific circumstances. See Vienna Convention, supra note 34, arts. 31-
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should be the rule pacta sunt servanda-the principle that "[e]very treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith. ' 298 The Court should lean towards the teleological or functional
approach, according to which it should always determine the objects and
purposes of the treaty and give effect to them. It is only by so doing that the
Court will be able to uphold the great promises in the Act and compel the
usually reluctant Member States to maintain faith with the Court. When the
issue of interpretation relates to the AU Act and its protocols, then a flexible
and effective approach will be justifiable.
The ICJ has, for example, adopted the principle of effectiveness and im-
plied powers consistent with the aims and purposes of the UN Charter in
cases affecting the organs of the UN. In Reparation for Injuries Suffered in
the Service of the United Nations (Reparation case),299 for example, the
Court held that "an interpretation which would deprive the Minorities Treaty
of a great part of its value is inadmissible."300 However, the process of inter-
pretation and the wide margin of appreciation should not be subordinated to
arbitrary devices. As Judge Hackworth observed, in the Reparation case,
"[p]owers not expressed cannot freely be implied. Implied powers flow from
a grant of expressed powers, and are limited to those that are 'necessary' to
the exercise of powers expressly granted." '' Striking a balance between
these contending views will, undoubtedly, exact the AU Court's creative
ability.
It is vitally important for future protocols to vest the AU Court with the
power of judicial review to counterbalance the extensive powers of the po-
litical organs. The European Community Treaty, for example, makes general
provisions for this, giving the ECJ the power to:
review the legality of acts adopted jointly by the European Parliament and
the Council, of acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the ECB,
other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the European
Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-t-vis third parties.
It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member
State, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence,
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this
Treat or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of pow-
ers. 302
298. Id. art. 26.
299. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J.
174 (Apr. 11).
300. id. at 180.
301. Id. at 198.
302. European Community Treaty, supra note 193, art. 230.
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If the action is well founded, the ECJ has the power to void it and, in the
case of a regulation, to state "which of the effects of the regulation which it
has declared void shall be considered as definitive. '" 30 3
Pending its establishment, interpretative matters over both the AU Act
and the PAP Protocol will be submitted to the AU Assembly, "which shall
decide by a two-thirds majority,"3 4 a provision which, like the peace of
God,30 5 passes all understanding. This provision raises extremely fascinating
constitutional questions of how a political organ, such as the Assembly, can
transform itself into a judicial body, capable of interpreting its own actions
vis-iz-vis the Act. Will the Member States of the Assembly have the inde-
pendence of thought and action to give an unbiased interpretation of matters
"arising from the application or implementation" of the Act? How will the
actions of the Assembly be checked to ensure that they conform to the provi-
sions of the Treaty, if the same Assembly vests itself with the power of in-
terpretation? Will the Assembly be able to annul its acts through a majority
vote? The absence of an independent force that can neutralize the excesses
of the Assembly has created an absence of a political symmetry. The solu-
tion to these foreseeable confusions lies in an immediate adoption of the pro-
tocol to set up the Court.
It may be assumed that the yet-to-be-established AEC Court of Justice
(AEC Court) will be overtaken by the AU Court, in view of the apparent
conflict between the AEC Treaty and the AU Act.306 However, because the
protocol on the AU Court is yet to be elaborated, it may be necessary to
briefly highlight the constituent elements of the AEC Court under the AEC
Treaty. The reason for such an exercise is that the future protocol is not
likely to be radically different in substance from the provisions in the AEC
Treaty. Like the AU Act, the AEC Treaty establishes an AEC Court to inter-
pretation the provisions of the Treaty.30 7 In deciding disputes submitted to it
concerning the "interpretation and application" of the Treaty, the Court
"shall ensure the adherence to law."3 8 The phrase "the interpretation and
application of'-"two distinct terms relating to two distinct operations- 30 9
has been given a broad interpretation to include any dispute between States
concerning the responsibility of one of them for an alleged breach of an in-
303. Id. art. 231.
304. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 26; PAP Protocol, supra note 225, art. 20.
305. See Philippians 4:7 (KJV).
306. See AU Act, supra note 14, art. 33(2) (providing that "[t]he provisions of this Act
shall take precedence over and supersede any inconsistent or contrary provisions of the Treaty
establishing the African Economic Community").
307. See AEC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 18(1). For commentary on the AEC Court, see
generally Chris M. Peter, The Proposed African Court of Justice-Jurisprudential, Proce-
dural, Enforcement Problems and Beyond, 1 E. AFR. J. PEACE & HUM. RTS. 117 (1993) and
NALDI, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, supra note 77, at 245-47.
308. AEC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 18(2).
309. ROSENNE, supra note 24, at 224.
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ternational obligation, whatever its origin.310 Similarly, in the Case Concern-
ing Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua,311 the
ICJ, in its "first significant judicial pronouncement regarding the meaning of
'application, ' ' '312 maintained that the appraisal of conduct in the light of the
relevant principles of the treaty pertains to the application of the law rather
than to its interpretation; and this must be undertaken in the context of the
general evaluation of the facts which are established in relation to the appli-
cable law.313
The AEC Court has both a contentious and an advisory 314 mandate. The
AEC Court shall, for example, entertain "actions brought by a Member State
or the Assembly on grounds of the violation of the provisions of this Treaty,
or of a decision or a regulation or on grounds of lack of competence or abuse
of powers by an organ, an authority or a Member State." '315 Similarly, parties
to a "dispute regarding the interpretation or the application of the provisions
of [the AEC] Treaty" may, failing amicable settlement, also refer the matter
to the Court.3 16 Lastly, the Assembly may refer any dispute concerning the
AEC Protocol on RECs to the Court as a measure of "last resort." '317 This
emphasis on amicable settlement is a common refrain in most African re-
gional and sub-regional instruments318 and strikes at the heart of African ju-
310. See, e.g., Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, 15-16;
Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J.
390, 427-28 (Jurisdiction and Admissibility Judgment of Nov. 26); Application of the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v.
Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. 594, 615-17 (Preliminary Objections Judgment of July 11); Oil Platforms
(Iran v. U.S.), 1996 I.C.J. 803, 820 (Preliminary Objections Judgment of Dec. 12); Questions
of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriva v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 115, 123 (Preliminary
Objections Judgment of Feb. 27).
311. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 117.
312. ROSENNE, supra note 24, at 224 n.51 & 224.
313. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 117.
314. See AEC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 18(3) (providing that the Court, "shall decide
on actions brought by a Member State or the Assembly," and, "at the request of the Assembly
or Council, [can] give advisory opinion[s]"). For further discussion on advisory opinions, see
generally Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J.
66 (Jul. 8).
315. AEC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 18(3)(a); cf European Community Treaty, supra
note 193, art. 227 (providing that "[a] Member State which considers that another Member
State has failed to fulfill an obligation under this Treaty may bring the matter before the Court
of Justice"). The European Community Treaty, however, provides that a Member State must
first take a matter to the Commission, before proceeding to the ECJ. Id.
316. AEC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 87(1).
317. AEC Prot. on RECs, supra note 150, art. 30.
318. See, e.g., Treaty of the South African Development Community (SADC), Aug. 17,
1992, art. 32, 32 I.L.M. 116 (1993), reprinted in 5 REVUE AFRICAINE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL ET COMPARt [RADIC] 415 (1993) (The SADC Treaty provides that disputes
arising from the interpretation and application of the SADC Treaty should be settled amicably
through a process of friendly settlement. If a dispute cannot be settled amicably, it is referred
to the SADC Tribunal).
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risprudence. African culture frowns upon litigation, the adversarial and adju-
dicative procedures common to Western legal systems. Africans consider
third party adjudication as generally confrontational; they favor consensus
and amicable settlement of disputes.319
The judgments of the AEC Court are final and, therefore, not subject to
appeal,32° though the question of whether the Court will have power to revise
its own judgment is not addressed.321 It is submitted that the AU Court
should be vested with such power, in light of new evidence, under conditions
as might be set out in the Rules of the Court.322 The Court should also be
able to interpret its own decisions.323 The judgments of the AEC Court are,
however, binding on Member States and organs of the AEC.324
Finally, but importantly, "[t]he Court of Justice shall carry out the func-
tions assigned to it independent of the Member States and other organs of
the Community." '325 The AEC Assembly, now to be subsumed in the AU As-
sembly, may also confer on the Court power to assume jurisdiction by virtue
of the Treaty "over any dispute other than those referred to in" the AEC
Treaty.326 This implies that the Assembly may refer to the Court disputes be-
tween natural or legal persons. Indeed, natural and legal persons have proved
to be effective guardians of the EC legal order and have contributed signifi-
cantly to the evolution of the EC law.327 Individuals should be allowed ac-
cess to the future AU Court. The function of the Court in a Union having the
ambitious aims it set for itself should be to protect the "state of law." It is,
therefore, extremely important that "individuals must... be able to appeal
directly to the Court of Justice against an act of one of the institutions of the
Union infringing their basic rights." '328
A problematic issue is the nature of the relationship between the pro-
posed AU Court and the African Human Rights Court that is also awaiting
its establishment. On June 9, 1998, at Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, the OAU
319. See generally TASLIM 0. ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW (1962)
(describing African forms of adjudication).
320. AEC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 87(2).
321. Cf Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Community, art.
40, reprinted in EUROPEAN UNION LAW: DOCUMENTS 209 (Frank Emmert ed. 1999) [hereinaf-
ter ECI Statue] and Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Justice of the European
Communities of 19 June 1991, art. 102, reprinted in EUROPEAN LAW: DOCUMENTS 218 (Frank
Emmert ed.) [hereinafter ECJ Rules of Procedure].
322. Prot. to African Charter, supra note 143, art. 28(3).
323. Id. art. 28(4).
324. AEC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 19.
325. Id. art. 18(5).
326. Id. art. 18(4).
327. See, e.g., Christopher Harding, The Private Interest in Challenging Community Ac-
tion, 5 E.L. REv. 354 (1980); Carol Harlow, Towards a Theory of Access for the European
Court of Justice, 12 Y.E.L. 213 (1992).
328. Report on European Union by Belgium Prime Minister, "Tindemans Report," 1/76
BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES (Dec. 29, 1975) (Supp. 1993) (on file with the California Western
International Law Journal).
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adopted a Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the Afri-
can Human Rights Court.3 29 The proposed Court will "complement the pro-
tective mandate of the African Commission," conferred upon it by the Afri-
can Charter.33 ° The Human Rights Court is vested with jurisdiction
extending "to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpreta-
tion and application of the [Banjul] Charter, [its] Protocol and other relevant
Human Rights instrument ratified by the States concerned. '33 1 Like the AEC
Court, and possibly the AU Court, the Human Rights Court is also fitted
with advisory powers.332
There is a real possibility of jurisdictional conflicts between the two
courts, particularly because the AU Act also contains human rights provi-
sions.33 3 Such fragmentation of dispute settlement mechanisms creates the
attendant possibility, even if remote, of creating disparate norms, as both
courts might give conflicting interpretations to the provisions of relevant
human rights instruments invoked before each Court. The result will be to
thwart, rather than develop, human rights jurisprudence. International law
should develop uniformly in the continent and, by extension, throughout the
international legal community. The issues "flowing from the multiplicity of
procedures and mechanisms" 334 have, indeed, been major concerns of inter-
national lawyers in recent years. 335 The ICJ has also reflected on the prob-
lem:
329. See Prot. to African Charter, supra note 143.
330. Id. art. 2 & pmbl. For commentaries on the Protocol, see Nsongurua J. Udombana,
Towards the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights: Better Late Than Never, 3 YALE
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 45 (2000); Gino J. Naldi & Konstantinos D. Magliveras, Reinforcing
the African System of Human Rights: The Protocol on the Establishment of a Regional Court
of Human and Peoples' Rights, 16 NEm. Q. HUM. RTS. 431 (1998); Andre Stemmet, A Fu-
ture African Court for Human and Peoples' Rights and Domestic Human Rights Norms, 23 S.
AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 233 (1998); John Mubangizi & Andreas O'Shea, An African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights, 24 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 256 (1999); Makau Mutua, The African
Human Rights Court: A Two-legged Stool?, 21 HUM. RTs. Q. 350 (1999).
331. Prot. to African Charter, supra note 143, art. 3.
332. Id. art. 4 (providing that "[a]t the request of a Member State of the OAU, the OAU,
any of its organs, or any African organization recognized by the OAU, the Court may provide
an opinion on any legal matter relating to the Charter or any other relevant human rights in-
struments").
333. See AU Act, supra note 14, arts. 3(e) - (h) (seeking, inter alia, to encourage interna-
tional cooperation, taking due account of the UN Charter and the UDHR; promote peace, se-
curity and stability in Africa; "promote democratic principles and institutions, popular partici-
pation and good governance; and promote and protect human and peoples' rights in
accordance with the African Charter and other relevant human rights instruments").
334. REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA vii (Malcolm Ev-
ans ed., 1998).
335. See generally Tullio Treves, Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice
on Questions Raised by Other International Tribunals, 4 MAX PLANCK U.N. Y.B. 215 (2000);
Hugh Thirlway, The Proliferation of International Judicial Organs and the Formation of In-
ternational Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HAGUE'S 75TH ANNIVERSARY 433 (W. P.
Heere ed., 1999); Jonathan Charney, The Impact on the International Legal System of the
Growth of International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697 (1999);
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The proliferation of international courts gives rise to a serious risk of con-
flicting jurisprudence, as the same rule of law might be given different in-
terpretations in different cases .... A dialogue among judicial bodies is
crucial. The International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations stands ready to apply itself to this end if it receives the
necessary sources.36
In the case of Africa, a possible solution will be to expand the mandate
of the Human Rights Court to cover interpretation of the AU Act and halt es-
tablishment of the Court of Justice, particularly in view of the very lean
purse of the continental body. There may also be strength in collapsing the
Human Rights Court into the AU Court; either way, the truth is that Africa
cannot afford two supra-national courts in these austere times. 337
E. The Commission
The Commission "shall be the Secretariat of the Union."33 It shall be
composed of the Chairman, his or her deputy or deputies and the Commis-
sioners, to be assisted by the necessary staff for the smooth functioning of
the Commission.339 The Assembly of the AU will determine its structure,
functions and regulations.34° Before inauguration of the AU Assembly, the
OAU Assembly had mandated its Secretary General, in consultation with
Member States, "to submit proposals regarding the structure, functions and
powers of the Commission. 341 The AU Assembly has renewed that man-
date, authorizing "the Interim Commission to complete its proposals on
structure of the Commission for submission to Member States and undertake
all the necessary measures to facilitate the election and appointment of the
Chairperson, the Deputy Chairperson and the Commissioners in July
2003.'342
Symposium, The Proliferation of International Tribunals: Piecing Together the Puzzle, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 697 (1999).
336. Statement of the President of the ICJ, Gilbert Guillaume to the UN General Assem-
bly of 26 Oct. 2000, quoted in Karin Oellers-Frahm, Multiplication of International Courts
and Tribunals and Conflicting Jurisdiction-Problems and Possible Solutions, 5 MAX
PLANCK U.N. Y.B. 67, 68 (2001); cf similar statement from the former ICJ President Schwe-
bel, ICJ PRESS COMMUNIQUE, 99/46 of 26 Oct. 1999.
337. For a fuller analysis of this problem, see Nsongurua J. Udombana, A Needful Dual-
ity or a Needless Duplication? The African Court of Justice and the African Court on Human
and Peoples'Rights, 28 BROOK. J. lNT'L L. (forthcoming 2003).
338. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 20(1); see also id. art. 1.
339. Id. art. 20(2). They are to be "assisted by the necessary staff for smooth functioning
of the Commission." Id.
340. Id. art. 20(3); see also art. 9(1)(i) (providing that the Assembly shall "appoint the
Chairman of the Commission and his or her deputy or deputies and Commissioners of the
Commission and determine their functions and terms of office").
341. Decision on Implementation, supra note 83, 5.
342. Decision on Interim Period, supra note 84, $ 2(vi); see also id. 9[ 2(vii) (authorizing
"the Interim Chairperson to prepare the financial implications of the structure of the Commis-
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The structure of the Commission will, no doubt, be influenced by those
of the defunct OAU Secretariat,343 the AEC Secretariat"' and, plausibly, the
European Commission 34 5-described as "the catalyst of the European Un-
ion. '346 Under the ABC Treaty, for example, the Secretariat implements the
decisions of the Assembly, applies the regulations of the Council and pro-
motes development programs. 341 It also prepares proposals for the program
of activity of the ABC as well as the budget and, upon their approval by the
Assembly, ensures their implementation.348 Finally, the AEC Secretariat
drafts studies aimed at attaining the objectives of the AEC.349
The AU Assembly has, meanwhile, designated the Secretary General,
the Assistant Secretaries General and the Staff of the General Secretariat of
the OAU as the Interim Commission pursuant to Article 33(4) of the AU
Act.35" The Secretary General is the Interim Chairperson with the Assistant
Secretary Generals acting as Commissioners of the Union.
351
Some of the functions of the Commission and of its Chairman are, how-
ever, scattered in the AU Act. The Commission, for example, will receive
sion and undertake the necessary consultations with Member States prior to submitting them
to the Executive Council and ultimately to the Assembly in July 2003").
343. Article II of the Rules of the Secretariat lists the functions of the Secretary-General
of the OAU Secretariat to include the following: he submits to the Member States, a month in
advance of the OAU Summit, the budget and the minutes of the Council of Ministers and spe-
cialized commissions; he communicate a copy of the notification of accession or adhesion to
the Charter to Member States; he receives a written notification from any State wishing to re-
nounce its membership; receive a written request from any Member State for the amendment
or revision of the Charter and notify all the Member States accordingly; accept, on behalf of
the OAU, gifts, bequests and other donations after approval by the Council of Ministers; call
ordinary and extraordinary sessions of the Council of Ministers and of the Assembly; draft the
provisional agenda and communicate it to the Member States; prepare and submit the OAU's
annual budget for the approval of the Council of Ministers; and create or abolish, subject to
the approval of the Council of Ministers, any administrative or technical offices or sections
which he deems necessary for the proper functioning of the General Secretariat.
344. AEC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 22. Under the AEC Treaty, the secretariat is
charged with securing the "implementation of the decisions of the Assembly and the applica-
tion of the regulations of the Council; promot[ing] development programmes; ... prepar[ing]
proposals concerning the programme of activity and budget and upon their upon their ap-
proval by the Assembly ensure the implementation thereof," and drafting studies with the aim
of attaining the objectives of the AEC. Id. art. 22(2).
345. Cf. European Community Treaty, supra note 193, art. 211 (vesting on The Commis-
sion the responsibility of ensuring that the provisions of the treaty and decisions are correctly
applied; formulating recommendations or delivering opinions on matters dealt with in the
treaty; participating in the shaping of measures taken by the Council and the Parliament and
exercising powers conferred on it by the Council for the implementation of the rules laid
down by the latter). For a description and conceptualization of the Commission, see THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Geoffrey Edwards & David Spence eds., 1994).
346. EUROPEAN UNION, INTERINSTITUTIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 221, at ix.
347. AEC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 22(2).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Decision on Interim Period, supra note 84, 2(iv).
351. Id. I 2(v).
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the instruments of accession to the AU Act from any Member wishing to do
so. 352 It shall receive notification of intention to accede to the Act from any
African State, transmit the notification to all Member States and transmit the
decision of the Union on such request to the State concerned.3 53 The Com-
mission will also receive written notification from any State wishing to re-
nounce its membership from the AU and inform Member States accord-
ingly.354 Proposals for the amendment of the AU Treaty must be submitted
to the Chairman of the Commission, who will transmit the proposals to
Member States within thirty days of receiving them.355 The Chairman of the
Commission is also mandated to transmit a certified true copy of the AU Act
to the Government of each signatory State. 356
Undoubtedly, the Commission will be the anchor of the AU. It must,
therefore, be properly grounded "firm and deep," in order for it to withstand
the billows that will inevitably row it. The AU must emphasize the quality of
human resources that will run the Commission and be prepared to pay com-
petitive salaries in order to hire quality technocrats. 357 It is gratifying that Af-
rican leaders have taken the right steps in this direction. As an interim meas-
ure, the Council of Ministers, at its 76th Ordinary Session in South Africa, in
July 2002, granted a "15% salary increase, across the board, to the entire
staff [of the OAU] retroactively, with effect from 1st March 2002, ' 358 and
requested "the General Secretariat ... [to] determine in absolute terms, the
financial implications of the salary increase granted and to take necessary
steps to implement immediately the decision for the benefit of the current
Staff. 35
9
Furthermore, it is important that the staff of the Commission should be
appointed purely on the basis of merit and professional qualifications. They
should also be insulated, as far as possible, from political wrangling, to en-
able them to perform their functions impartially. Member States must avoid
the temptation to place their people in certain positions in order to have a
presence. The Commission should be allowed to play both constructive and
conservative roles.
The Union should also periodically provide quality training to equip the
staff of the Commission and, in particular, to expose them to new informa-
tion and communications technologies. Special training programs should
also be organized to upgrade the skills of OAU staff members, many of
352. See AU Act, supra note 14, art. 27(3).
353. Id. art. 29.
354. Id. art. 31(1).
355. Id. art. 32(2).
356. Id. art. 33(5).
357. See Decision on Improvement in the Conditions of Service of OAU Staff, Council of
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whom will, inevitably, be reabsorbed by the AU.36 ° These are not luxuries;
they are necessities. They are essential for strengthening the Commission's
and Africa's ability, afortiori, to compete globally. The AU will be as good
as the Commission; a Commission that works with outdated facilities will
produce outdated results. On the other hand, any man will forge a bar of
iron, if he is given a hammer.
Finally, it will be important for the PAP to exercise some form of con-
trol on the Commission. It should have the right to summon, where the need
arises, the Commissioner and other members of the Commission for ques-
tioning on every aspect of their activities-something similar to the Commit-
tees of Inquiry of the European Parliament. The European Community
Treaty, for example, provides that:
[i]n the course of its duties, the European Parliament may, at the request of
a quarter of its Members, set up a temporary Committee of Inquiry to in-
vestigate, without prejudice to the powers conferred by this Treaty on
other institutions or bodies, alleged contraventions or maladministration in
the implementation of Community law, except where the alleged facts are
being examined before a court and while the case is still subject to legal
proceedings. 361
This should be seriously considered in any future amendment of the
PAP Protocol because it is one of the ways by which the Commission will be
made to function effectively and not relapse into the bureaucracy that was
the hallmark of the OAU Secretariat.
F. The Permanent Representative Committee
The Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) "shall be composed
of permanent representatives of the Union and other Plenipotentiaries of
Member States." '362 This structure was not formally recognized under the
OAU, but it is analogous to the Committee of Ambassadors and the Com-
mittee of Permanent Representatives under the EU Treaty.3 63 The PRC,
which will work closely with the Commission, will prepare the work of the
AU Council and act on its instructions.364 It will also probably be involved in
the process of nomination and appointment of Commissioners and will look
into selection and appointment of consultants and follow-up on implementa-
360. See, e.g., Decision on Interim Period, supra note 84, 2(iv) (designating "the Sec-
retary General, the Assistant Secretaries General and the Staff of the General Secretariat of
the OAU as the Interim Commission in accordance with Article 33(4) of the Constitutive
Act").
361. European Community Treaty, supra note 193, art. 193.
362. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 21(1).
363. Cf European Community Treaty, supra note 193, art. 207(1) (placing on the Com-
mittee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) the responsibility of "preparing the work of
the Council and for carrying out the tasks assigned to it by the Council").
364. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 21(2).
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tion of Summit decisions. The PRC will arguably assume more functional
responsibilities than the current Committee of Ambassadors. This is why it is
important to orient its powers and functions properly.365
G. The Specialized Technical Committees
The Specialized Technical Committees (STCs) 66 are the same sectoral
committees established under the AEC Treaty,367 the major difference being
that, under the AU Act, the STCs are to report to the Executive Council.3 68
Under the AEC Treaty, the STCs reported to the Economic and Social
Commission, composed of ministers responsible for economic development,
planning and integration of each Member State, which, in turn, reported to
the Council of Ministers.369 Ministers or senior officials in charge of relevant
sectors within their competence shall make up the STCs.37° Within its field
of competence, the STC shall:
shall prepare projects and programmes of the Union and submit it to the
Executive Council; ensure the supervision, follow-up and the evaluation of
the implementation of decisions taken by the organs of the [AU]; ensure
the coordination and harmonization of projects and programmes of the[AU]; submit to the Executive Council, either on its own initiative or at
the request of the Executive Council, reports and recommendations on the
implementation of the provisions of [the] Act; [and] carry out any other
functions assigned to it for the purpose of ensuring the implementation of
the provisions of [the] Act.371
365. See Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Sirte Decision on
the African Union (EAIIG/Dec. I(V)), Council of Ministers, 34, O.A.U. Doc. CM/2210
(LXXIV) [hereinafter Report of the Sec. Gen.] (on file with the California Western Interna-
tional Law Journal).
366. These are seven in number, although the Assembly has the power to restructure the
existing ones or establish new ones. AU Act, supra note 14, arts. 14(1) & 14(2). The existing
ones are the committee on Rural Economy and Agricultural Matters; the Committee on
Monetary and Financial Affairs; the Committee on Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters;
the Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and Envi-
ronment; the Committee on Transport, Communications and Tourism; and the Committee on
Health, Labor, Culture and Human Resources. Id. art. 14(1).
367. See AEC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 25(1). Cf Decision on Implementation, supra
note 83, 9(i) (acknowledging the existence of ministerial conferences and commissions and
stressing the need to ensure that they work as integral parts of the AU).
368. See AU Act, supra note 14, art. 14(1).
369. See AEC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 26; cf the coordination organs established un-
der the AEC Prot. on RECs. AEC Prot. on RECs, supra note 150, arts. 6-10.
370. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 14(3); cf AEC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 25(3) ("Each
Committee shall comprise a representative of each Member State.").
371. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 15. Cf AEC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 26. In interpret-
ing the provisions of article 26 of the AEC Treaty, dealing with the functions of technical
committees, Gino Naldi maintains that "the term 'decisions' in this context refers to secon-
dary legislation only, i.e., Council decisions and Commission regulations." NALDI, THE
ORGANIZATION OF AFRIcAN UNITY, supra note 77, at 245. Naldi did not provide any plausible
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Meanwhile, the Secretary General (now Chairman of the Commission)
has been mandated to prepare and submit to the Council of Ministers of the
OAU a comprehensive report on various aspects of the functioning of the
STCs.37 2 The report, according to the mandate, should include their terms of
reference and modalities for program formulation and implementation; the
relationship between the STCs and similar organs of the RECs, African gov-
ernmental and non-governmental organizations and international institutions;
and streamlining of activities and functional and programatic relationships
between STCs and existing ministerial sectoral conferences and commis-
sions. 373
In examining these functions, the Commission's Chairman should take
notice of certain ministerial conferences established by the OAU Assembly
to deal with specific sectoral issues. These include the OAU Labor and So-
cial Affairs Commission, which is tripartite in nature-comprised of gov-
ernments, employers and workers-and organized jointly with the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO); the Conference of Ministers of Health,
organized jointly with the World Health Organization (WHO); the Confer-
ence of Ministers of Industry, organized jointly with the Economic Commis-
sion for Africa (ECA) and UN Industrial Development Organization; and the
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) Regional Conference for Africa.
The STCs and the ministerial commissions/conferences would thus need to
be rationalized.374
It is vitally important to involve the private sector in the workings of the
STCs. Together with the civil society organizations, the private sector is a
major component of the economic integration process. An atmosphere must
be created that will enable it to be proactive in finding regional mechanisms
for coordinating their input into the AU in accordance with relevant proto-
cols. A private sector forum for dialogue with the AU should also be created.
H. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council
The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) is arguably
the most important specialized organ in respect of all activities relating, di-
rectly or indirectly, to the intended establishment of the AU. This is one or-
gan that will most likely provide for the participation of civil society. It
"shall be an advisory organ composed of different social and professional
groups of the Member States of the Union. '3 75 It is significant to note that
the Economic and Social Commission of the AEC is composed of the minis-
ters responsible for economic development, planning and integration of the
reason for his restrictive interpretation. It is submitted, however, that the wordings of the AU
Act should be interpreted literally.
372. See Decision on Implementation, supra note 83, 9(ii).
373. Id.
374. See Report of the Sec. Gen., supra note 365, [ 36.
375. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 22(1).
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Member States,376 and that Representatives of the RECs have the right to
take part in the Economic and Social Commission's meetings.377
The AU Assembly will determine the functions, powers, composition
and organization of the ECOSOCC,378 though it is not clear how the social
and professional groups will be elected or appointed and on what issues the
ECOSOCC would be competent to offer advice and to whom this advice
would be submitted for consideration. These are questions that the Secretary
General will have to address, in consultation with Member States.
The OAU has mandated that the Secretary General submit to the Coun-
cil of Ministers, after consultation with the Member States, a comprehensive
report on ECOSOCC, with recommendations on wide-ranging issues.37 9
These include the structure, functioning, areas of competence and relation-
ship of the ECOSOCC to other organs of the Union; the procedure and crite-
ria for selecting the members of ECOSOCC, including their terms of office;
the relationship between ECOSOCC and African regional non-governmental
and professional groups; and the Rules of Procedure of ECOSOCC and the
preparation of its work program.380
Significantly, the AEC Treaty provides for the establishment of consul-
tative mechanisms between the AEC, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and socio-economic organizations and associations, 381 "with a view
to encouraging the involvement of the African peoples in the process of eco-
nomic integration and mobilizing their technical, material and financial sup-
port.- 382 The ECOSOCC of the AU Act might possibly be the consultative
mechanism of the AEC Treaty.383 In this way, it could also contribute to the
preparation of the work programs and meetings of the Specialized Technical
Committees and offer the AEC some advice. 384 Finally, it is important that
the ECOSOCC should be a priority institution to ensure the effective repre-
sentation of civil society organizations and their input into the decision-
making processes of the Union.
376. See AEC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 15(2). The AEC Commission is expected, inter
alia, to prepare policies and strategies for cooperation in the fields of economic and social
development among African countries, and between Africa and the international community,
and make recommendations to the Assembly, through the Council, on the coordination and
harmonization of the activities of the RECs; to coordinate, harmonize and supervise the
activities of the Secretariat and the Committees; to examine and assess the reports and recom-
mendations of the Committees and forward them to the Assembly, through the Council; and
supervise the preparation of international negotiations and report to the Assembly, through the
Council. Id. art. 16.
377. Representatives of RECs have the right to take part in the Economic and Social
Commission's meetings. Id. art. 15(3).
378. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 22(2).
379. See Decision on Implementation, supra note 83, 7(a)(ii).
380. Id.
381. See AEC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 90.
382. Id. art. 90(1).
383. See Report of the Sec. General, supra note 365, 31.
384. Id.
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I. The Financial Institutions
The last, but by no means the least, of the Organs expressly mentioned
in the AU Act is the Financial Institutions. Three of these are envisaged: the
African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund, and the African Invest-
ment Bank (ATB). 385 Like the AU Court, the "rules and regulations" of the
financial institutions are to be worked out in a separate protocol. 86 These in-
stitutions will probably perform functions similar to the Bretton Woods insti-
tutions-the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).387 It
is, however, not clear if the African Development Bank (ADB) will merge
with the future AIB or, in fact, if the ADB will metamorphose into the AIB.
The latter appears the most reasonable, in view of the ADB's present struc-
ture and infrastructure.
The ADB was established by an Agreement signed in Khartoum, Sudan,
in August 1963, by thirty independent African States, though its present
membership has been enlarged to include nearly all the current Member
States of the OAU.38 8 Initiated by the ECA, the Bank was established "to fi-
nance projects and specific investment programmes which foster regional
cooperative and integrated development in African countries."3 89 It provides
its Member States with technical assistance for studies, preparation and exe-
cution of projects and programs.3 90 It grants loans to governments and pri-
vate enterprises with government guarantees,39' as well as "lines of credit for
on-lending to national and subregional development banks."'3 92
Finding a compromise between Member States on these issues will cer-
tainly take some time. Because issues such as the extent of transferred sover-
eignty and authority of each mechanism will be decided through discussion
among Member States, confrontation should be expected.
385. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 19.
386. Id.
387. The World Bank was created as a development bank to assist in the development
and restructuring of war-torn and underdeveloped countries; while the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) was created to provide short-term loans to member countries experiencing bal-
ance of payment deficits and to advise them on exchange rate matters.
388. Emmanuel G. Bello, Regional Cooperation and Organization: African States, in 4
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J. The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
Africa presently holds the highest record of interstate wars and con-
flicts.393 These conflicts have contributed more to the socio-economic de-
cline of the Continent and the suffering of the civilian population than any
other factor.394 Indeed, conflicts:
have brought about death and human suffering, engendered hate and di-
vided nations and families. Conflicts have forced millions of our people
into a drifting life as refugees and internally displaced persons, deprived of
their means of livelihood, human dignity and hope. Conflicts have gob-
bled-up scarce resources, and undermined the ability of our countries to
address the many compelling needs of our people.
3 95
When the OAU Charter was adopted in 1963, it created the Commission
of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration to accomplish the purposes of the
Charter 96 and to provide a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of "dis-
putes"397 among Member States.3 98 A Protocol was also adopted in 1964,399
which defined the duties and powers of the Commission. There was no pro-
vision for a formal adoption of the Protocol. This was done deliberately to
avoid undue delay that might stultify efforts to address urgent security prob-
lems plaguing the Member States."° ° The Protocol merely required the ap-
393. See Yaoundg Declaration (Africa: Preparing for the 21st Century), Assembly of
Heads of State and Government, 32d Ord. Sess., 6, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Decl.3 (XXXII),
Yaound6, Cameroon (1996) [hereinafter Yaound6 Declaration].
394. See Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union, AU Assembly, 1st Ord. Sess., Durban, South Africa (2002), pmbl. para. 10,
available at http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/summit-council/secprot.htm (last visited Jan. 4,
2003) [hereinafter Protocol on Peace and Security].
395. Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establish-
ment within the OA U of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution,
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 29th Ord. Sess., $ 9, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Decl.3
(XXIX), Cairo, Egypt (1993), reprinted in Letter Dated 10 August 1993 from the Permanent
Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations Addressed to the
Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Annex II, Prov. Agenda Item 43, U.N. Doc.
A/48/322 (1993) [hereinafter Cairo Decl.].
396. See OAU Charter, supra note 12, art. XIX & VII(4).
397. "Disputes" in this context refer not only to justifiable disputes, i.e., matters that
raise legal questions and that can be settled by the application of international law, but also to
political issues or other extra-legal considerations. See, e.g., Mavrommatis Palestine Conces-
sions, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 11-12; East Timor (Port. v. Austl.) 1995 I.C.J. 90, 99-
100 (June 30).
398. See Taslim 0. Elias, The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration of
the Organization of African Unity, 40 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 336 (1964); Colin Legum, The Spe-
cialised Commissions of the Organisation of African Unity, 2 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 587 (1964).
399. See Protocol of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, signed
July 21, 1964, 3 I.L.M. 1116 (1964) [hereinafter Protocol on Dispute Settlement].
400. See Elias, supra note 398, at 347.
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proval of the OAU Assembly for it to become an integral part of the OAU
Charter." 1 This approval was given at the first Assembly in July 1964.402
The Commission was not a judicial body, though it provided three
modes of settlement-mediation, conciliation and arbitration-all of which
have technical meanings. Mediation and conciliation are non-adjudicatory,
informal procedures. Mediation, a non-binding procedure, involves an offi-
cial third party who seeks to reconcile the views and claims of the parties or
offers advice for a possible solution. 403 By contrast, conciliation refers to an
impartial examination of the dispute and a search for acceptable settle-
ment. 4 This requires objective evaluation and clarification of the issues in
dispute in the attempt to bring about agreement between the parties through
mutually acceptable terms."° Arbitration, on the other hand, a compulsory
means of dispute settlement, is a judicial method that delivers a binding de-
cision "based on law by a tribunal whose composition is determined by the
parties."" Submission to arbitration is dependent upon prior agreement of
the parties."0'
The Commission was also vested with the powers of investigation and
inquiry with regard to disputes submitted to it.4"' The Commission, an ad
hoc body, never became operational and was, subsequently, abolished. Even
before its abolition, the Commission was restricted to interstate conflicts. 9
Its non-functionality has been attributed to Africa's mistrust of formal dis-
pute settlement, though, "paradoxically, African States have not been averse
to the establishment of numerous ad hoc bodies under the auspices of the
OAU" and the involvement of the UN to settle their disputes. 0
In 1992, the Secretary-General of the OAU submitted to the 56th Ordi-
nary Session of the Council of Ministers and the 28 h Ordinary Session of the
Assembly of the OAU, meeting in Dakar, Senegal, the Report of the Secre-
tary-General on the Establishment, within the OAU, of a Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. 4" Following the report,
401. See Protocol on Dispute Settlement, supra note 399, art. XXXII.
402. See id.
403. NALDI, ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, supra note 77, at 24; see also Protocol
on Dispute Settlement, supra note 399, art. XXI.
404. NALDI, ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, supra note 77, at 24.
405. Id. at 24; see also Protocol on Dispute Settlement, supra note 399, arts. XXIV &
XXVI.
406. NALDI, ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, supra note 77, at 25.
407. Id. at 25; see also Protocol on Dispute Settlement, supra note 399, arts. XXV &
XXIX. See generally J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DIsPuTE SETTLEMENT (1998).
408. Protocol on Dispute Settlement, supra note 399, art. XVIII.
409. See Osita C. Eze, Background Paper, UN, SEMINAR ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
REGIONAL COMMISSIONS ON HuMAN RIGHTS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AFRICA, Monrovia,
Liberia, Sept. 10 - Sept. 21, 1979, UN Doc. HR/Liberia/1979BP/3, at 7 (on file with the Cali-
fornia Western International Law Journal).
410. See NALDI, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, supra note 77, at 28-29.
411. Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment, Within the OAU, of a
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Assembly of Heads of
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the OAU Assembly adopted a declaration establishing, within the OAU, a
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
(MCPMR),412 to take over from the redundant and ad hoc Commission of
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. One of the deficiencies of ad hoc
arrangements for dealing with conflicts is that "they are reactive and reme-
dial rather than proactive and preventative." '413 The establishment of the
MCPMR is thus intended "to bring to the processes of dealing with conflicts
in our continent a new institutional dynamism, enabling speedy action to
prevent or manage and ultimately resolve conflicts when and where they oc-
cur."
4 14
Surprisingly, however, the AU Act did not initially provide for any
mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, though this
is one of the goals of the Union.41 The Act failed to factor in the Cairo Dec-
laration, which established the MCPMR. It also failed to factor in the Decla-
ration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organiza-
tion of African Unity on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in
Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World,416 in which
the OAU rededicated itself "to work together towards the peaceful and
speedy resolution of all the conflicts on [the African] continent." '417 It failed
to factor in the Cairo Agenda for Action,418 in which the OAU pledged "to
give the maximum political and financial support to the OAU Mechanism
for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, for its effective peace-
making operations, by involving all segments of the population and mobiliz-
ing adequate official and private resources for the OAU Peace Fund."4" 9
State and Government, 29th Ord. Sess., O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Dec. 1 (XXXVII) (1993), re-
printed in OAU, RESOLVING CONFLICTS IN AFRCIA: IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS 3 (OAU In-
formation Services Publication-Series (II), 1993) (on file with the California Western Inter-
national Law Journal).
412. See Cairo Decl., supra note 395, [ 13.
413. Gino J. Naldi, Future Trends in Human Rights in Africa: The Increased Role of the
OA U, in THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE,
1986-2000 1, 4 (Malcolm Evans & Rachel Murray eds., 2002) [hereinafter Naldi, Future
Trends in Human Rights in Africa].
414. Cairo Decl., supra note 395, 12.
415. See AU Act, supra note 14, art. 4(g) (providing "non-interference by any Member
State in the internal affairs of another").
416. Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization
of African Unity on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamen-
tal Changes Taking Place in the World, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 26th
Ord. Sess., O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Decl.1 (XXVI), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (1990), available at
http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity-to-union/pdfs/oau/hog/2HoGAssembly1990.pdf (last
visited Nov. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Addis Ababa Declaration].
417. Id. $ l1.
418. See OAU, Relaunching Africa's Economic and Social Development: The Cairo
Agenda for Action, Council of Ministers, 17th Extra-Ord. Sess., O.A.U. Doc. CM/1892
(LXII), Cairo, Egypt (1995).
419. id. l 10(v).
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The omission was baffling, considering the sentiment of the OAU in its
1999 Algiers Declaration that "the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management and Resolution is a valuable asset for our continent which must
be nurtured and consolidated," and that the mechanism "symbolises the con-
crete resolve of our continent to fully assume its responsibilities. 4 °2 0 The
omission of the MCPMR in the AU Act has been attributed to the "haste
with which the drafters [of the Act] had to meet the impatient deadlines set
by Libya."'4 21 Africa needs to learn that even the finest baker must allow his
dough to rise.
As an afterthought, though not an accident, the OAU has rectified these
deficiencies by incorporating the objectives and principles of the Cairo Dec-
laration as "an integral part of the declared objectives and principles of the
African Union. ' 2 2 The Central Organ of the MCPMR is now included as
one of the Organs of the AU, in accordance with Article 5(2) of the AU
Act.423 The AU Assembly has also adopted a Protocol on the Establishment
of the Peace and Security Council of the AU, 24 following an earlier decision
of the OAU Council of Ministers.4 25 However, "pending the ratification and
entry into force of the Protocol, the Cairo Declaration on the OAU Mecha-
nism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution shall remain
valid."4 26
The Central Organ of the MCPMR consists of the Member States of the
OAU Summit Bureau, with the Secretary-General and the Secretariat as its
operating arm.427 Its primary objective is anticipation and prevention of con-
flicts, 428 which has the advantage of "obviat[ing] the need to resort to the
complex and resource-demanding peace-keeping operations, which our
countries will find it difficult to finance. 429 Where conflicts have already
occurred, the MCPMR will be expected to embark on peace-making mis-
sions in order to facilitate resolutions of such conflicts. Civil or military ob-
servation groups may be deployed, though such must be limited in scope and
duration.430 In any case of degeneration of conflicts, the assistance of the UN
420. Algiers Declaration, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 35th Ord. Sess.,
para. 13, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Decl. I (XXXV), Algiers, Algeria (1999), available at
www.au2002.gov.za/docs/summit-council/algiers.htm (last visited July 2, 2002).
421. Jakkie Cilliers, Commentary: Towards the African Union, 10(2) AFR. SEC. REV.
(2001), at http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/10No2/Cilliers.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2002).
422. See Decision on Implementation, supra note 83, 8(a)(i).
423. Id. I 8(a)(ii).
424. See AU Assembly Dec. on Peace and Security Council, supra note 151.
425. See Decision on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union, Council of Ministers, 67th Ord. Sess., O.A.U. Doc. CM/Dec. 31 (LXXVI) Rev.1,
Durban, South Africa (2002) [hereinafter Council of Ministers Dec. on Peace and Security
Council].
426. AU Assembly Dec. on Peace and Security Council, supra note 151, para. 4.
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may be sought.431 The Central Organ of the MCPMR has, in the past, re-
viewed various conflict situations in Africa, including internal conflicts.4 32
In all situations, the MCPMR must be guided by the objectives and
principles of the OAU Charter and, afortiori, the AU Act, particularly sov-
ereign equality and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Member States, their inalienable right to independent existence, the peaceful
settlement of disputes and the inviolability of borders-uti possidetis juris. It
will additionally function on the basis of the consent and the cooperation of
the parties to a conflict.433 This dogmatism regarding sovereignty and non-
intervention might weaken the MCPMR. The ideal thing is to allow it to
treat each case on its merits. A revision of these doctrines has even been
called for434 and this appears to be the only way by which the AU will dem-
onstrate that it is not a reincarnation of the OAU. It is assuring that the OAU
has already requested the Secretary General "to undertake a review of the
structures, procedures and working methods of the Central Organ, including
the possibility of changing its name.
435
Before leaving this subject, it is important to mention that the AU has
already adopted a Protocol on the establishment of Peace and Security
Council (PSC) for the continent.436 Once it has entered into force, the Proto-
col will supersede all resolutions and decisions of the OAU relating to the
MCPMR in Africa that are in conflict with it.437 The Protocol establishes an
operational structure "for the effective implementation of the decisions taken
in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations
and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruc-
tion. ' 43 8 The AU also adopted the Protocol because of the threat that "illicit
proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons"
posed to peace and security in Africa, deflating efforts of African countries
to improve the living standards of their citizens.439
431. Id. 116.
432. Cf. Letter Dated 28 March 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Cameroon
to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Security
Council, UN Doc. S/1994/351 (1994); Letter Dated 7 November 1997from the Acting Per-
manent Observer of the Organization of African Unity to the United Nations Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1997/869 (1997).
433. Cairo Decl., supra note 395, 14.
434. See M. A. Hefny, Enhancing the Capacities of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution: An Immediate Agenda for Action, 7 AFR. Soc'y
INT'L AND COMP. L. [ASICL PROC. 7] 176, 180 (1995).
435. See Decision on Implementation, supra note 83, 8(a)(iii).
436. See Protocol on Peace and Security, supra note 394.
437. Id. art. 22(2).
438. Id. pmbl. para. 17.
439. Id. pmbl. para. 13; see also id. pmbl. para. 14 ("Aware that the problems caused by
landmines and the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light
weapons constitute a serious impediment to Africa's social and economic development, and
that they can only be resolved within the framework of increased and well coordinated conti-
nental cooperation.").
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The PSC will be a decision-making organ for the prevention, manage-
ment and resolution of conflicts. It "shall be a collective security and early-
warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict
and crisis situations in Africa."'  The Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a
Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force and a Special
Fund will support the PSC."'
The Protocol sets out the objectives" 2 and principles" 3 of the PSC. It
provides for the composition,'" functions" 5 and powers"46 of the PSC as
well as matters of procedure." 7 The objectives are many. Firstly, in addition
to protecting the environment, the Protocol seeks to protect life and property
of Africans, enhance their well-being and create good conditions for sustain-
able development. 448 The Protocol, however, acknowledges that these are
unachievable without peace, security and stability, which the PSC must
promote."49 Where conflicts have broken out in Africa, as they often do, the
440. Id. art. 2(1).
441. Id. art. 2(2).
442. See generally id. art. 3 (including the promotion of "peace, security and stability in
Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-
being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions con-
ducive to sustainable development; anticipate and prevent of conflicts ... [but] where con-
flicts have occurred, the [PSC] shall have the responsibility to undertake peace-making and
peace-building functions for the resolution of these conflicts; promote and implement peace-
building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent the resur-
gence of violence; co-ordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and com-
bating of international terrorism in all its aspects; develop a common defence policy for the
Union, in accordance with the article 4(d) of the [AU Act]; promote and encourage democ-
ratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental
freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of
efforts for preventing conflicts").
443. See id. art. 4 (providing that the PSC "shall be guided by the principles enshrined in
the Constitutive Act, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights. It shall, in particular, be guided by the following principles: (a) peaceful settle-
ment of disputes and conflicts; (b) early responses to contain crisis situations so as to prevent
them from developing into full-blown conflicts; (c) respect for the rule of law, fundamental
human rights and freedoms, the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law; (d)
interdependence between socio-economic development and the security of peoples and States;
(e) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States; (f) non interference
by any Member State in the internal affairs of another; (g) sovereign equality and interde-
pendence of Member States; (h) inalienable right to independent existence; (i) respect of bor-
ders inherited on achievement of independence; () the right of the Union to intervene in a
Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances,
namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, in accordance with Article 4(h) of
the Constitutive Act; [and] (k) the right of Member States to request intervention from the
Union in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(j) of the Constitu-
tive Act").
444. Id. art. 5.
445. Id. art. 6.
446. Id. art. 7.
447. Id. art. 8.
448. See id. art. 3(a).
449. Id.
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PSC shall "undertake peace-making and peace-building functions for the
resolution of these conflicts."45 The PSC also has a role to play in post-
conflict reconstruction in Africa. This role involves promotion and imple-
mentation of peace-building that is aimed at "consolidat[ing] peace and pre-
vent[ing] the resurgence of violence."'451
In recognition of the current threat posed by international terrorism, the
Protocol has, as one of its objectives, the prevention and combating of terror-
ism. Consequently, the PSC shall harmonize efforts of the Member States in
this regard."' One of the principles in the AU Act is to establish a common
defense policy for the continent.453 The PSC Protocol reflects this as part of
its objectives. 4  The Protocol recognizes the values of democracy, good
governance, rule of law, human rights (including respect for the sanctity of
human life) and humanitarian law. These values contribute towards prevent-
ing conflicts; so, the Protocol aims to promote and encourage them. 5
The PSC shall consist of ten members elected for a term of two years
and five members elected for a term of three years in order to ensure conti-
nuity. 456 Its functions include the "promotion of peace, security and stability
in Africa; early warning and preventive diplomacy; peace-making, including
the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and enquiry; and peace sup-
port operations and intervention, pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the [AU
Act]." In addition to any other function that the AU Assembly might de-
termine, the PSC will also engage in "peace-building and post-conflict re-
construction; humanitarian action and disaster management; and any other
function that the Assembly might decide upon.
' 58
Other matters covered by the Protocol include entry points and modali-
ties for action;459 the role of the Chairperson of the Commission, which in-
450. Id. art. 3(b).
451. Id. art. 3(c).
452. See id. art. 3(d).
453. See AU Act, supra note 14, art. 4(d).
454. See Protocol on Peace and Security, supra note 394, art. 3(e).
455. Id. art. 3(f).
456. Id. art. 5 (setting the criteria with regard to each prospective Member State, includ-
ing "commitment to uphold the principles of the Union; contribution to the promotion and
maintenance of peace and security in Africa." In this respect, "experience in peace support
operations would be an added advantage; capacity and commitment to shoulder the responsi-
bilities entailed in membership; participation in conflict resolution, peace-making and peace-
building at regional and continental levels; willingness and ability to take up responsibility for
regional and continental conflict resolution initiatives; contribution to the Peace Fund and/or
Special Fund created for specific purpose; respect for constitutional governance, in accor-
dance with the Lom6 Declaration, as well as the rule of law and human rights; having suffi-
ciently staffed and equipped Permanent Missions at the Headquarters of the [AU] and the
[UN], to be able to shoulder the responsibilities which go with the membership; and commit-
ment to honor financial obligations to the Union.").
457. Id. art. 6; AU Act, supra note 14, arts. 4(h) & (j).
458. Protocol on Peace and Security, supra note 394, art. 6.
459. Id. art. 9.
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cludes, "deploy[ing] efforts and tak[ing] all initiatives deemed appropriate to
prevent, manage and resolve conflicts."46 There is also the Panel of the
Wise, which, inter alia, shall advise the PSC and the Commission's Chair-
person "on all issues pertaining to the promotion, and maintenance of peace,
security and stability in Africa." '461 There are also provisions on the continen-
tal early warning system, 2 the African Standby Force,463 peace building'
64
and humanitarian action.465
More importantly, the Protocol defines the relationship between the
PSC and regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and
resolution, including, of course, the MCPMR. The relationship is organic.
Thus, the PSC shall promote initiatives towards anticipating and preventing
conflicts and, where they have already occurred, perform peace-making and
peace-building functions.466 The PSC will do this in consultation with the
Regional Mechanisms. 467 This requires the regional mechanisms to keep the
PSC fully and continuously informed of their activities and ensure that these
activities are closely harmonized and coordinated with the activities of the
PSC. The PSC must reciprocate in like manner."68
Overall, the MCPMR and the PSC appear to herald "a more resolute ap-
proach to dispute settlement by the [AU]. 4a69 Endowing the MCPMR with a
preventive role in conflict management is particularly welcome because pre-
vention is still better than a cure. The Mechanism and, later, the PSC should
be sufficiently funded by the Member States to succeed in its appointed
tasks. This will be the yardstick by which to measure the political will of
Member States concerning peace and security in the continent. Willing the
end is one thing; willing the means is quite another. It is absence of the po-
litical will of Member States that accounted for the failure of previous ef-
forts. The AU should coordinate its activities with other African organiza-
tions, cooperate where appropriate and practicable with neighboring
countries, and liaise with the UN in regards to peacekeeping and peace-
making activities.470 These may appear to be insignificant factors, but, really,
the truth is that enormous things often turn upon tiny things.
460. Id. art. 10(1).
461. Id. art. 11(3).
462. Id. art. 12.
463. Id. art. 13(1) (establishing an African Standby Force which "shall be composed of
standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their coun-
tries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice").
464. Id. art. 14.
465. Id. art. 15.
466. Id. art. 16(2).
467. Id.
468. Id. art. 16(3).
469. Naldi, Future Trends in Human Rights in Africa, supra note 413, at 5.
470. Id. at 4.
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IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE AU AND ITS MEMBER STATES
What is the status of the AU Act and, by extension, the AEC Treaty vis-
at-vis municipal legal systems? Similarly, what is the relationship between
the organization and its members?47 ' And what are the legal characters of the
AU institutions vis-ai-vis municipal institutions? Will the decisions of the AU
Court, for example, create binding norms for the Member States of the Un-
ion? These are important questions having international legal significance.
To start with, the AU Act contains no provision on the obligations of States
Parties to bring their internal laws into conformity with their obligations un-
der international law. But such an obligation must be assumed.472 In general,
"a failure to bring about such conformity is not in itself a direct breach of in-
ternational law ... a breach arises only when the state concerned fails to ob-
serve its obligations on a specific occasion.- 473
International organizations are entities that allow States to "pool their
sovereignty and their resources in order to tackle common problems and find
common solutions and, therewith, act in the national interest. '474 Such pool-
ing of sovereignty, in the case of Africa, implies some limitations of national
laws in favor of the AU law. In other words, no State that has ratified the AU
Act and/or any of its protocols can refer to its domestic law in order to es-
cape obligations derived from the Act.4 75 The law in this respect is well set-
tled and supported by numerous decisions of the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ) and the ICJ. 476 In the case, Treatment of Polish
Nationals and other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Terri-
tory,4 77 for example, the PCIJ stated thus:
It should ... be observed that.., a State cannot adduce as against another
State its own Constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent
upon it under international law or treaties in force. Applying these princi-
ples to the present case, it results that the question of the treatment of Pol-
ish nationals or other persons of Polish origin or speech must be settled
471. See generally ATHENA DEBBIE EFRAIM, SOVEREIGN (IN)EQUALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS (2000) and MAGDALENA MARTINEZ, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1996).
472. See Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 10, at 20
(Feb. 21).
473. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 35.
474. Jan Klabbers, The Life and Times of the Law of International Organizations, 70
NORDIC J. INT'L L. 287, 293 (2001).
475. See Vienna Convention, supra note 34, art. 27 ("[a] party may not invoke the provi-
sions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty...").
476. See, e.g., Case of the S.S. "Wimbledon" (U.K. v. F.R.G.), 1923 P.C.I.J (set. A) No.
1, at 25 (Jun. 28); Fisheries Case, (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 132 (Dec. 18); Nottebohm
Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 20-21 (Apr. 6).
477. Treatment of Polish Nationals and other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the
Danzig Territory, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 44 (Feb. 4).
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exclusively on the bases of the rules of international law and the treaty
provisions in force between Poland and Danzig.
478
The Member States of the AU, by ratifying the AU Act and its proto-
cols, recognize the legal order of the AU, with all its unforeseeable potential
developments. Such recognition introduces the AU law into fields previously
governed exclusively by municipal law. It permits some of the institutions of
the AU, such as the Court, to assume the character of supranational enti-
ties.479 The AU organs will thus exercise their powers in the fields contem-
plated by the AU Act and its protocols, and will require national agencies to
refrain from interfering in these fields. The decisions and pronouncements of
the AU Court, either in its contentious or advisory capacities, will create
binding norms for the Member States of the Union.
The same position applies as regards the EU law and the national law of
the Member States.48° Thus, in Costa v. ENEL481 and Amministrazione delle
Finanze dello Statto v. Simmenthal SpA,482 the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) enunciated the doctrine of limitation of the sovereign rights of the
Member States and the transfer to the European Communities certain pow-
ers, stressing that EC (EU) law has precedence over domestic law. Accord-
ing to Advocate-General Lagrange, in the ENEL case:
the Treaty establishing the [EEC], as well as the other two 'European
Treaties,' created its own legal system which, although distinct from the
legal system of each of the Member States, by virtue of certain precise
provisions of the Treaty, which bring about a transfer of jurisdiction to the
Community institutions, partly replaces the internal legal system.
483
478. Id. at 24.
479. An organization has a supranational character if an organ composed of individual
persons can make decisions that bind on the Member States. See Bindschedler, supra note 74,
at 1295.
480. See Francesco Capotorti, European Communities: Community Law and Municipal
Law, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 165, 165-66 (Rudolf Bemhardt ed.,
2000). See generally TREVOR HARTLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
(1998); ADJUSTING TO EUROPE: THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON NATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES (Yves M6ny et al. eds., 1996); F. E. Dowrick, A Model of the
European Communities' Legal System, 3 Y.B. EUR. L. 169 (1983); Richard Plender, The
European Court as an International Tribunal, 42 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 279 (1983); JOHN USHER,
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND NATIONAL LAW: THE IRREVERSIBLE TRANSFER? (1981).
481. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E.C.R. 585, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425 (1990).
482. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA,
[1978] E.C.R. 629.
483. Case 6/64, 1964 E.C.R. at 602 (emphasis in original). Similarly, "[b]y creating a
Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its own
legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more particularly,
real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of power from the states
to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within lim-
ited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and them-
selves." Id. at 593.
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The Court reiterated this motif in the Simmenthal case, maintaining that
there is a separate "Community legal order" and that national courts must
protect rights conferred upon individuals by it.484
Some scholars have argued that the transfer of powers to international
organs in no way changes the legal status of the Member State.485 States
"continue, as before, to be subject only to international law, since the consti-
tution of the organization itself remains a treaty." '486 This opinion finds its
echo in the Permanent Court of International Justice's (PCU) famous hold-
ing that, rather than incompatible with sovereignty, entering into commit-
ments is actually an attribute of State sovereignty. 487
What is not clear, at least from the wordings of the AEC provisions, is
whether the AU Court will be empowered to annul community, or for that
matter, municipal, legislation. It has been argued that "[t]he absence of judi-
cial review enabling the Court to annul Community legislation would un-
dermine the rule of law and marginalize the Court to the point of irrelevancy.
Such power must be implied." '488 Comparatively, the ECJ can require that a
national statute be set-aside on the ground of incompatibility with EC law,
though it cannot invalidate municipal law.489
Two different situations, however, must be distinguished with regard to
the internal or domestic application of the AU Act and its protocols. This re-
lates to the dualist and monist controversy. The dualists insist that "interna-
tional law and internal law are two separate legal orders, existing independ-
ently of one another;"4 9° the monists insist that international law and internal
law are part of the same order.491 If the dualist view is taken, then the ques-
tion that arises is on what basis can it be said that either of the two systems is
superior over the other?492 This question does not, however, arise in the case
of monism, because it is presumed that "one or other of them [is] supreme
over the other within that order."4 93 However, both these schools of thought
assume that there is a common field where the international and municipal
484. Case 106/77, [1978] E.C.R. 629; see also Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesell-
schaft mbH v. Einfuhrund Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel, [1970] E.C.R. 1125
(where Court referred to Community law as "[t]he law stemming from the Treaty, an inde-
pendent source of law," to be distinguished from and to take precedence over opposing na-
tional laws).
485. See Bindschedler, supra note 74, at 1295.
486. Id.
487. See Case of the S.S. "Wimbledon," 1923 P.C.I.J (ser. A) No. 1. For further discus-
sion, see Jan Klabbers, Clinching the Concept of Sovereignty: Wimbledon Redux, 3 AUSTRIAN
REV. INT'L& EUR. L. 345 (1998).
488. NALDI, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, supra note 77, at 245.
489. See Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factor-
tame Ltd et al. (No.2), [1990] ECR 1-2433.
490. Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law Considered from
the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, in II RECUEIL DES COURs 5, 70 (1957).
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. Id. (emphasis in original).
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legal orders can operate at the same time regarding the same subject mat-
ter;494 the problem is, which is to be master?
For States with a monist tradition, the courts can apply the obligations
of international law, in this case, the AU Act and its protocols, immediately
after ratification of the Treaty. Hans Kelsen, for example, was a diehard mo-
nist. According to his hypothesis of the primacy of international law, the ba-
sic norm of national law is not:
a norm only presupposed in juristic thinking but a positive norm of inter-
national law; and then the question arises as to the reason for the validity
of the international law order to which the norm belongs on which the va-
lidity of the individual national law is founded-the norm in which this
legal order finds its direct, although not its ultimate, reason for the valid-
ity. This reason of validity, then, can only be the basic norm of interna-
tional law, which, therefore, is the indirect reason for the validity of the
national legal order. As a genuine basic norm, it is a presupposed-not a
positive norm. It represents the presupposition under which general inter-
national law is regarded as the set of objectively valid norms that regulate
the mutual behaviors of states.
495
For States favoring a dualist approach, the substantive norms of the
Treaty must be "transformed" or "adopted" in order to become applicable in
domestic law.4 96 With regards to the EU law, for example, Lord Denning
frequently invoked Community law in the English Court of Appeal, referring
to it as "a new system."'4 97 He, however, insisted that parts of Community
law operate in the UK "as part of our law," an opinion reiterated in the two
English cases of Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith4 98 and Garden Cottage Foods v.
Milk Marketing Board.4 99 In Garden Cottage Foods v. Milk Marketing
Board, Lord Diplock echoed this dualist view, asserting that the European
Economic Community Treaty creates enforceable rights for individuals
within the UK qua statute law via the UK European Communities Act of
1972. '00 But Lord Wilberforce maintained that "[c]ommunity law, which is
what the English court will be applying, is, in any case, sui generis."50' The
problem of whether international treaties can be incorporated in domestic
494. See BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 31. Fitzmaurice believes that this common field
does not exist, making the entire monist-dualist controversy "unreal, artificial and strictly be-
side the point." See Fitzmaurice, supra note 490, at 71.
495. KELSEN, supra note 184, at 215.
496. See Thomas Buergenthal, Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in Na-
tional and International Law, in IV RECUEIL DES CouRs 303 (1992); Antonio Cassese, Mod-
em Constitutions and International Law, in III RECUEiL DES COURs 331 (1985).
497. See, e.g., Bulmer v. Bollinger, 2 All E.R. 1226, 1231-33 (1974).
498. Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith, 3 All E.R. 325, 328 (1979); Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith (No.
2), 1 All E.R. 111, 120 (1981).
499. Garden Cottage Foods v. Milk Marketing Board, 2 All E.R. 770, 778 (1983).
500. See id. at 775.
501. Id. at 783.
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law without losing their character as international law, which may have con-
sequences for their interpretation, however, remains a thorny issue.
In sum, the AU law will be binding not only on Member States-
including their legislative agencies, courts and administrations-but also on
natural and legal persons under their jurisdictions."' 2 Like the European ex-
perience, most African countries will find their national bureaucracies in-
creasingly taken up with AU decision-making, though some countries might
be able to manage their relations with the AU more effectively than others,
exercising more strategic influence where there is more centralized national
coordination of AU decision-making. It could also be extrapolated that the
rights and obligations created by AU law will bind the citizens of Member
States, not only their governments.
V. CONCLUSION
The adoption of the AU Act has opened a cleft in the pitiless walls of
the continent, though the anxiety is greater than the joy. The Act has identi-
fied the component institutions of the AU, but the specific powers and duties
of these institutions need to be determined, along with the sequencing of
their establishment. As indicated earlier, some key institutions have already
been established-the AU Assembly, the Executive Council and the Com-
mission. However, because political and economic integration is, presuma-
bly, the major motif of the Act, the immediate task should be to establish
and/or revitalize other institutional arrangements encompassed in the Act.
This is the only way they can effectively implement the objectives of the Act
and meet the challenges of globalization, democratization and popular par-
ticipation.° 3 In creating institutions there will, of course, be need for prioriti-
zation. The priority given to respective organs will depend on what is seen as
the overriding political concern. If the principal impetus of the AU is for re-
gional economic cooperation and integration, then the ECOSOCC, the STCs
and the financial institutions should be prioritized. If, on the other hand, the
first agenda is governance and democracy, then the PAP and the Court of
Justice should be established first. Still, if the main concern is peace and se-
curity-on the basis that salus populis suprema lex 504 -then "the existing
Organs of the OAU should suffice, but will require a much more extensive
502. Arguably, this would include persons in an "international zone" (in which neither
domestic nor international law is said to apply) because persons present in such a zone are
within State jurisdiction and are validly subject to the exercise of authority by the territorial
State. They are, in this sense, clearly within the sphere of that State's legal competence.
503. Cf Durban Decl., supra note 21, 16 (where African leaders committed themselves
"to urgently establish all institutional structures to advance the agenda of the African Union
and call[ed] on all Member States to honour their political and financial commitments and to
take all necessary actions to give unwavering support to all the Union's initiatives aimed at
promoting peace, security, stability, sustainable development, democracy and human rights in
[the] continent").
504. The safety of the people is the highest law. CICERO, DE LEGIBUS, bk. III, pt. iii, § 8.
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engagement with existing problems and related institutions."505 It does, how-
ever, appear that "[t]he first task [of the AU] is to achieve unity, solidarity,
cohesion, [and] cooperation among peoples of Africa and African states." 5°6
In that case, the AU "must build all the institutions necessary to deepen po-
litical, economic and social integration of the African continent."507
It is hoped that the institutional structure of the AU will be variable
across domains of competency and that its policy style will be flexible, het-
erogeneous and issue-specific, rather than corresponding to any national
style. It is also hoped that there will be an open policy-making process, man-
aged by officials of the various organs in an anticipatory and consensual
manner. There should be no division, discord or lack of adaptation of the
Organs to each other. Collaboration between the Organs of the AU will be
crucial to attaining the objectives contained in the AU Act.
Collaboration between the political and supranational Organs will be
particularly important, due to the fact that the former represents the interests
of the individual States, while the latter represents the interests of the Union.
The two must be reconciled because "a house divided against itself cannot
stand." 508 This will also make for interest representation to be sectorally
structured and linked with a vast, though sometimes incoherent, network of
national and Afro-wide groups. The AU is much more than the sum of its
Member States; it is a new institutional complex in its own right that will
also increase the complexity of its constituent parts.
Women should be mainstreamed and involved in the operation of all as-
pects of regional integration in Africa. It is also important to consider organ-
izational culture, structures and processes that may conflict with women's
empowerment goals. Happily, the AU recognizes "the pivotal role of women
in all levels of society and ... that the objectives of the African Union can-
not be achieved without the full involvement and participation of women at
all levels and structures of the Union."50 9 What remains is how to take this
from the realms of idealism and put it into practice, ensuring gender equity
in all institutions of the AU.
Active participation of young people in the processes and institutions of
the AU is equally important, given that half the population in Africa is
505. See The Architecture and Capacity of the African Union, Economic Comm. for Af-
rica, African Union Symposium, A.D.F. Il (2002), available at http://www.uneca.org/adfiii/
auissuepn2.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2003).
506. AU Chairperson Thabo Mbeki, Address at the Launch of the AU in Durban, South
Africa (July 9, 2002), available at http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/speeches/mbek097a.htm
(last visited Jan. 6, 2003) (noting also that the second task confronting the AU "is that of de-
veloping new forms of partnerships at all levels and segments of our societies, between seg-
ments of our societies and our governments and between our governments," id.).
507. Id.
508. Abraham Lincoln, Address at the State Republican Convention (June 16, 1858),
available at http://www.usembassy.de/usaletexts/speeches/rhetoric/abehouse.htm (last visited
Jan. 20, 2003).
509. Durban Decl., supra note 21,9 [18.
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young. They are at the center of many of Africa's problems, including the
HIV/AIDS pandemic and conflicts. They are also the key to finding solu-
tions to these crises. In light of the above, the Assembly of the AU should be
commended for welcoming and recognizing "the important contribution of
the youth, women, business community, parliamentary representatives and
civil society and [for calling] upon these stakeholders to continue participat-
ing fully as partners in the regeneration of the African Continent through the
programmes of the African Union."5 1 Again, as with women, African
youths want to see more of practice than precepts.
The AU Act provides a great and historical opportunity for major eco-
nomic and political transformations of Africa-if the current bad weather of
indifference on the part of its leaders will allow it to take off from the
ground. Because the AU does not exist for its own sake, but for the sake of
the continent's citizens, African leaders should quickly lay the foundation
for the institutions that will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared.
Africa should not allow itself to be classified as "a scar on the conscience of
the world." '' Contrary to the "Ham Theory,"5"2 Africa is not destined to be
the wretched, oppressed and exploited continent of the earth. In fact, what a
man becomes in life is not stamped on his birth certificate. A man reaps what
he sows, no matter where he is, just as fire never fails to warm, regardless of
where in the world it burns. This applies, with equal force, to a nation, a
State or a continent. Africans need a decolonizing of the mind!5" 3
The AU should strive to achieve what is ideal, but it should also be pre-
pared to strike a balance between the ideal and the reality that may not al-
ways measure up to the ideal. This is vital, because "the penalty for insisting
on what is ideal may be to achieve no result at all." '5 14 A passionate, yet more
rational, prayer should be that of the medieval theologian: "Good Lord, give
510. Id.
511. Ewen MacAskill, Blair Scorns the Cynics-PM Attempts to Set New Partnership
Agenda for West, TiE GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 8, 2002, at I (quoting British Prime Minister
Tony Blair).
512. The "Ham Theory" posits that black peoples were victims of a fall, due to the curse
brought upon them by the irreverent behavior of their ancestor, Ham, who, it is alleged, was
the starting point of their race. The story is that Ham uncovered his father's (Noah) nakedness.
during the latter's drunken debauchery. Noah cursed Ham, declaring that he will be "a servant
of servants" to his brethren. See Genesis 9:25 (KJV). It is, however, submitted that this was
not a special curse upon the black race because Ham's descendants extended beyond Africa.
They included Cush (progenitor of Ethiopians), Mizraim (progenitor of Egyptians), Phut
(progenitor of Libyans and peoples of Africa), Canaan (progenitor of Palestinians), and Sin
(founder of the oriental peoples of China, Japan and India). See H.L. WILLMINGTON,
WILLMINGTON'S GUIDE TO THE BIBLE 12 (1984) (noting also that "as the curse was specifi-
cally leveled at Canaan and not Phut (who may have founded the African nations), there exist
absolutely no racial implications whatsoever within that curse," id. at 33).
513. See NGUGI WA THIONG'O, DECOLONISING THE MIND passim (1986) (an exhortation
for African writers to embrace their native tongues in their art).
514. See Andreas Jacovides, The Role of International Law in the World Today and To-
morrow, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE EVE OF THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 69, 78 (Interna-
tional Law Commission ed., 1997).
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me the courage to change the things that can be changed, the serenity to ac-
cept the things that cannot be changed and the wisdom to know the differ-
ence between the two." 515
515. Id.
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